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On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization declared a global influenza pandemic due to a 
novel influenza A virus subtype of H1N1. Public health emergencies, such as an influenza 
pandemic, can potentially impact disadvantaged populations disproportionately due to 
underlying social factors. Canada‟s First Nation population was severely impacted by the 2009 
H1N1 influenza pandemic. Most First Nation communities suffer from poor living conditions, 
impoverished lifestyles, lack of access to adequate health care, and uncoordinated health care 
delivery. Also, there are vulnerable populations who suffer from co-morbidities who are at a 
greater risk of falling ill. Moreover, First Nation communities that are geographically remote 
(nearest service center with year-round road access is located over 350 kilometers away) and 
isolated (only accessible by planes year-round) face additional challenges. For example, 
transportation of supplies and resources may be limited, especially during extreme weather 
conditions. Therefore, remote and isolated First Nation communities face unique challenges 
which must be addressed by policy planners in order to mitigate the injustice that may occur 
during a public health emergency.  
The Assembly of First Nations noted that there has been very little inclusion of First Nations‟ 
input into current federal and provincial pandemic plans. Disadvantaged groups know best how 
they will be affected by a public health emergency and are able to identify barriers and solutions. 
Therefore, the objective of my research was to gain retrospective insight into the barriers faced 
by three remote and isolated First Nation communities of sub-arctic Ontario (i.e., Fort Albany, 
Attawapiskat, and Kashechewan) during their 2009 H1N1 pandemic response. Culturally-
appropriate community-based suggestions for improvement of existing community-level 
pandemic plans were also elicited. Collected data informed modifications to community-level 
pandemic plans, thereby directly applying research findings.  
Being a qualitative community-based participatory study, First Nation community members were 
involved in many aspects of this research. Semi-directed interviews were conducted with adult 
key informants (n=13) using purposive sampling of participants representing the three main 
sectors responsible for health care services (i.e., federal health centers, provincial hospitals, and 
Band Councils). Data were manually transcribed and coded using deductive and inductive 
thematic analysis to reveal similarities and differences experienced within and between each 
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community (and government body) regarding their respective pandemic response. Another round 
of semi-directed interviews (n=4) and community pandemic committee meetings were conducted 
to collect additional information to guide the modifications to the community-level pandemic 
plans.   
Reported barriers due to being geographically remote and isolated included the following: 
overcrowding in houses, insufficient human resources, and inadequate community awareness. 
Primary barriers faced by government bodies responsible for health care delivery were reported 
as follows: receiving contradicting governmental guidelines and direction from many sources, 
lack of health information sharing, and insufficient details in community-level pandemic plans. 
Suggested areas for improvement included increasing human resources (i.e., nurses and trained 
health care professionals), funding for supplies, and community awareness. Additionally, 
participants recommended that complementary communication plans should be developed. As 
suggested by participants, community-specific information was added to update community-
level pandemic plans.  
Remote and isolated First Nation communities faced some barriers during their 2009 H1N1 
health sector pandemic response. Government bodies should focus efforts to provide more 
support in terms of human resources, monies, and education. In addition, various government 
organizations should collaborate to improve housing conditions, timely access to resources, and 
the level of coordination regarding health care delivery. Furthermore, as pandemic plans are 
dynamic, government bodies should continue to aide First Nation communities with updating 
their community-level pandemic plans to satisfy their evolving needs. These recommendations 
should be addressed so that remote and isolated western James Bay First Nation communities 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introductory Comments 
In March 2009, an outbreak of a severe acute respiratory infection occurred in Mexico, now 
known to be caused by a novel influenza A virus subtype (Cutler et al., 2009). The H1N1 or 
“Swine” influenza - as it became informally referred to - sustained efficient human-to-human 
transmission and quickly spread worldwide causing the World Health Organization (WHO) on 
June 11, 2009, to declare the first global pandemic in 41 years (Chang, Shih, Shao, Huang, & 
Huang, 2009). Antigenically similar to the “Spanish” influenza of 1918, the H1N1 influenza is a 
contagious respiratory disease composed of reassorted influenza viruses enabling this strain to be 
easily transmitted from human-to-human through respiratory droplets (Chang et al., 2009).  
During the 1918 “Spanish” influenza pandemic, some Aboriginal communities suffered a 
mortality rate of 50%, compared to the national mortality rate of non-Aboriginal communities of 
only 0.3% (Kermode-Scott, 2009). Similarly, recent studies have revealed that Aboriginal 
communities were disproportionately impacted during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic 
(Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010; Spence & White, 2010). Moreover, data have shown that 
Canada‟s remote First Nation populations were disproportionately affected by the H1N1 
influenza virus (Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010; Spence & White, 2010). Experts also 
claimed that federal data provided by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) has also 
underestimated the cases of H1N1 due to insufficient surveillance in First Nation communities 
leading to further inadequacies in pandemic responses (Webster, 2009).  
Differences in social, economic, and environmental factors, along with differences in public 
health preparedness, may account for the high incidence rate of the H1N1 influenza in 
Aboriginal populations (Kermode-Scott, 2009). Experts report that the continuous lack of 
adequate federal funding and social policies have resulted in the current living situations 
experienced by numerous First Nation communities, which appear to promote virus transmission 
(Webster, 2009). Furthermore, similar to the 1918 “Spanish” influenza, the H1N1 influenza 
infected younger people at higher rates (Chang et al., 2009; Kumar et al., 2009). Considering that 
demographically, Aboriginal communities are skewed towards the younger age groups - and the 
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general wellbeing of Aboriginal children falls well below national averages - great concern is 
warranted (Kermode-Scott, 2009).The higher incidence rates of the 1918 and 2009 influenza 
pandemics in First Nation communities infers that their special needs are still not being met, 
particularly with regards to formulating and implementing culturally sensitive, ethical pandemic 
plans.  
Reviewing the federal, provincial, and local pandemic influenza plans has revealed that some of 
First Nation communities‟ unique considerations are being recognized; however, it is unclear if 
the special needs of remote and isolated First Nation communities are actually being met (The 
Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector (CPIPHS), 2006; The Ontario Health 
Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (OHPIP), 2008). Little detail is provided regarding if proposed 
strategies in pandemic plans are feasible, effective, and how to realistically execute them in 
remote and isolated First Nation communities. It appears as if existing pandemic plans have not 
been properly informed by First Nation community members, mitigation strategies have not been 
formulated to be culturally sensitive, and proposed solutions continuously fail to address the 
underlying social factors (CPIPHS, 2006; OHPIP, 2008; Massey et al., 2009). 
Including disadvantaged groups in the planning process is vital in order to address and protect 
their rights (Uscher-Pines, Duggan, Garoon, Karron & Faden, 2007). In addition, disadvantaged 
groups know best how they will be affected by a public health emergency, being able to identify 
barriers to current public health recommendations, and are in a position to create innovative 
mitigation strategies (Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). Disadvantaged groups typically distrust the 
government; however, including disadvantaged groups in pandemic planning will build trust and 
aide in creating effective pandemic plans (Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). Therefore, it is critical that 
governments identify and meet the needs of groups within their country who are economically 
and socially disadvantaged in order to mitigate the injustice that may occur during a public 
health emergency (Uscher-Pines et al., 2007).    
1.1 Rationale 
In Canada, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) has reported that current federal and provincial 
pandemic plans do not adequately include First Nations‟ input (AFN, 2005). Remote First Nation 
communities of the James Bay coast faced outbreaks of the H1N1 pandemic influenza; however, 
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social factors (i.e., overcrowded houses, isolation, etc.) made recommended mitigation measures 
hard to execute (Romain, 2009). This study aimed to address the concerns of the Mushkegowuk 
Cree residing in remote and isolated First Nation communities of the western James Bay coast 
(i.e., Fort Albany, Attawapiskat, and Kashechewan) with regards to their pandemic response and 
how community-level pandemic plans can be modified to address their unique concerns.   
1.2 Objective 
One of the primary objectives of the study was to illuminate upon how the three study 
communities prepared and responded to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, if any barriers were 
encountered, and how these actions can be improved upon for the next public health emergency. 
Another primary objective was to discover if recommended pandemic planning components 
were executed effectively in the study communities. Community-based input was elicited to 
inform modifications to community-level pandemic plans, which can also be incorporated into 
future national and provincial pandemic influenza plans.      
1.3 Thesis Structure   
This thesis is structured into six chapters in a manuscript format.  
Introductory comments regarding the background, rationale, and objective of the research is 
included in chapter one.   
The literature reviewed in chapter two pertains to influenza, pandemics, and existing pandemic 
plans (special emphasis on sections addressing First Nations‟ concerns). 
Chapters three and four contain the two manuscripts which have been modified to fit the 
structure of this thesis. Chapter three “The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Response in Remote First 
Nation Communities of Sub-Arctic Ontario: Barriers and Improvements from a Health Care 
Services Perspective” presents the barriers faced and suggested improvements for the health 
sector pandemic response in three remote and isolated First Nation communities (In Press for the 
International Journal of Circumpolar Health). Chapter 4 “Government Bodies and their Influence 
on the 2009 H1N1 Heath Sector Pandemic Response in Remote and Isolated First Nation 
Communities of Sub-Arctic Ontario, Canada” presents how the three government bodies 
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involved in the delivery of health care to First Nations influenced the pandemic response in three 
remote and isolated First Nation communities.  
Chapter five describes the knowledge translation endeavour of this research, in which the 
collected data was used to inform modifications to three remote and isolated First Nation 
community-level pandemic plans.   
















CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
The objective of the literature review was to gather general information regarding influenza, 
influenza pandemics, existing pandemic plans, and First Nation communities‟ conditions. The 
search for literature was conducted between September 2009 and March 2011 using various 
search engines, including Google, Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science. Searches were 
conducted using various combinations of the following keywords: remote, isolated, First Nation, 
Aboriginal, vulnerable populations, Canada, Ontario, influenza, influenza virus, pandemic, 2009 
H1N1 influenza pandemic, pandemic planning, health care delivery. In addition, a search was 
conducted using the Google search engine to retrieve existing pandemic planning documents 
provided by the WHO, federal government, and provincial government in the English language 
published between 2003 to 2010.  
2.1 Influenza  
Influenza, commonly called the “flu”, is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza 
viruses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2011). These influenza viruses can 
cause mild to severe illness in humans and depending on the severity of the season, between 
2,000 and 8,000 Canadians can die of influenza and its complications annually (CDC, 2011; 
PHAC, 2011). 
2.1.1 Populations at Risk  
Some people are more at risk of seasonal influenza related complications, including elders (i.e., 
older than 65 years old), young children (i.e., younger than 5 years old), pregnant women, and 
people with certain underlying health conditions (i.e., diabetes, asthma, obesity, people with 
weakened immune systems, etc.) (CDC, 2011).  
2.1.2 Symptoms  
Common symptoms of the seasonal influenza include the following: fever, cough, chills, sore 
throat, headaches, tiredness, runny/stuffy nose, and muscle aches (Chang et al., 2009; CDC, 
2011). Some patients may also experience diarrhea and vomiting; however, these symptoms are 
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more common in children (Chang et al., 2009; CDC, 2011). In addition, some complications may 
arise from getting influenza, such as: pneumonia, ear and sinus infections, and worsening of 
chronic medical conditions (CDC, 2011).  
2.1.3 Diagnosis  
Since a person with influenza displays clinical symptoms similar to that seen with other 
infectious agents, such as the cold, influenza may be difficult to diagnose based solely on clinical 
symptoms (CDC, 2011). If it is known that influenza is active in the community and it is during 
the influenza season, cases of influenza are typically diagnosed without testing (CDC, 2011). 
However, in order to properly diagnose influenza as the infectious agent, upper respiratory 
specimens, like nasopharyngeal aspirates and swabs are taken for laboratory testing (Peiris, 
Poon, & Guan, 2009). 
2.1.4 Transmission of Influenza  
Influenza can be transmitted from human-to-human via respiratory droplets that are expelled 
when an infected person coughs, sneezes, and/or talks (Chang et al., 2009). A person can also 
become infected by touching an infected surface and then touching his/her mouth or nose 
(CPIPHS, 2006). It is noted that influenza viruses can survive on surfaces longer in conditions of 
low humidity and cold temperatures (CPIPHS, 2006). Transmission of influenza can be reduced 
by some basic infection control methods, such as: respiratory etiquette, hand hygiene, surface 
disinfection, and self-isolation if ill (CPIPHS, 2006).   
The period of communicability is when an infected person can spread the influenza virus to 
another person (First Nations and Inuit Health Branch – Ontario Region Pandemic Influenza 
Plan (FNIHB-OR PIP), 2009). It is important to note that the period of communicability of 
influenza starts 24 hours prior to the onset of symptoms; therefore, a person can infect other 
people with influenza before even knowing that he/she is sick (CDC, 2011). However, virus 
shedding and transmission is increased during the symptomatic period, which lasts 
approximately five to seven days after becoming infected (CPIPHS, 2006; CDC, 2011). The 
incubation period (i.e., the time between infection and developing symptoms) for influenza is 
one to three days (FHIHB-OR PIP, 2009).  
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2.1.5 Prevention of Influenza  
Receiving the seasonal influenza vaccine is a recommended method to prevent getting the 
seasonal influenza (CDC, 2011). The influenza vaccine is indicated for everyone 6 months and 
older who does not have a contraindication to the vaccine. The influenza vaccine either contains 
the inactivated, killed virus or the attenuated (weakened), live virus - both will elicit an immune 
response – thus, creating the required antibodies to defend against an influenza infection (CDC, 
2011). Substances called adjuvants are typically added to the inactivated influenza vaccine to 
increase the body‟s immune response to the vaccine; thus, smaller amounts of the virus are 
required when producing the vaccine (Coico & Sunshine, 2009). In general, the influenza 
vaccine is safe, although some common side effects may occur. The inactivated influenza 
vaccine may cause temporary soreness, redness, and/or swelling at the injection site, (low grade) 
fever, chills, and muscle aches (CDC, 2010). And the live influenza vaccine may cause a cough, 
runny nose, and/or sore throat (CDC, 2010).  
2.1.6 Treatment of Influenza  
Most people who fall ill with influenza will usually fully recover within two weeks (CPIPHS, 
2006). However, some people with more severe infections may be prescribed antiviral therapy, 
ideally within 48 hours of illness onset (CPIPHS, 2006). Antiviral therapy may also be 
prescribed for prophylactic purposes for people who are at high risk of developing influenza (i.e., 
health care workers, first responders, etc.) (CPIPHS, 2006). Neuraminidase inhibitors and 
adamantanes are the two main types of antiviral drugs used to treat influenza. Neuraminidase is a 
viral enzyme responsible for facilitating the release of newly made viruses, thereby allowing the 
infection to spread (Wilkins, Stoller, & Scanlan, 2003). Neuraminidase inhibitors block the 
action of neuraminidase; thus, newly made viruses are not released from the host cell (Wilkins et 
al., 2003; Rau, 2002). On the other hand, adamantanes inhibit viral replication and assembly 
inside the host cell (Rau, 2002). Antiviral drugs may cause some side effects, such as nausea and 
vomiting; however, one main concern with using antiviral drugs is the possibility of creating 
antiviral resistant strains of the virus (Rau, 2002; Wilkins et al., 2003; Fleming, Elliot, Meijer, & 
Paget, 2009).  
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2.2 Influenza Viruses 
Influenza is caused by influenza viruses and there are three types (i.e., influenza A, B, and C) 
which all belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae (Nakajima, 1997). Influenza A viruses will be 
focused on as they regularly cause epidemics, and they also have the potential to cause 
pandemics at irregular intervals (CPIPHS, 2006; WHO, 2005; WHO, 2009). 
 2.2.1 Influenza A Viruses  
Influenza A viruses are enveloped and comprised of eight single, negatively stranded ribonucleic 
acid (RNA) which contains their genetic information (Kacmarek, Dimas, & Mack, 2005; 
McCance & Huether, 2006). These eight genes encode eleven proteins, which have various 
functions and may undergo adaptive mutations which have the potential to affect the virus‟s 
virulence and pathogenicity (Chang et al., 2009). 
Influenza A viruses are subtyped according to the glycoproteins found on the lipid envelope of 
the virus, called hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, which are the key antigens that elicit an 
immune response in humans (Gatherer, 2009; Laver, Bischofberger, & Webster, 2000; Peiris et 
al., 2009). There are sixteen serotypes of influenza A hemagglutinin, which functions in binding 
the virus to the host cell (Gatherer, 2009). There are nine serotypes of neuraminidase, which 
functions in the exit of the virus from the host cell, allowing the virus to spread and infect other 
cells (Gatherer, 2009; Laver et al., 2000). Currently, the subtypes of influenza A that are 
circulating among people worldwide include: H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 viruses (CDC, 2005).   
Influenza A viruses originated from wild birds; therefore, wild birds are the natural host for all 
known subtypes of influenza A viruses (CDC, 2005). However, influenza A viruses can also 
infect other animals, such as, humans, pigs, and horses (CDC, 2005).   
2.2.2 Stages of Viral Infection 
Influenza viruses do not contain any metabolic organelles; therefore, to cause an infection and 
spread, viruses use a host cell‟s cellular machinery to replicate (Laver et al., 2000). To cause an 
infection, an influenza virus attaches to the host‟s respiratory tract epithelial cells (Rau, 2002; 
Wilkins et al., 2003). Once the virus attaches to the host cell, the virus enters, uncoats its 
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envelope, and begins replicating intracellularly using the host cell‟s cellular machinery 
(McCance & Huether, 2006; Rau, 2002). After the virus has replicated, the newly made viruses 
shed from the host cell, which usually kills the host cell in the process, to infect other host cells 
(Rau, 2002).  
As mentioned, influenza A viruses are comprised of an eight segmented genome (Kacmarek et 
al., 2005; McCance & Huether, 2006). Additionally, RNA viruses replicate without a 
proofreading mechanism; therefore, many errors in genetic coding can occur which may cause 
mutations and reassortment; thus, creating novel influenza virus strains (Chang et al., 2009; 
Gatherer, 2009). 
 2.2.3 Evolution of Viruses 
Viruses constantly evolve by means of antigenic drift and antigenic shift. These methods are 
referred to as antigenic variation, in which viruses escape host human immune responses by 
generating variants with different antigenic composition (Coico & Sunshine, 2009). Antigenic 
drift occurs often and refers to small, unpredictable, gradual changes that occur via point 
mutations in the two genes which encode hemagglutinin and neuraminidase (CDC, 2005; 
Nakajima, 1997). These point mutations result in minor changes to these surface proteins and 
produces new virus strains that may not be recognized by pre-existing antibodies, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of previous seasonal vaccines (CDC, 2005). Antigenic shift occurs 
occasionally and refers to an abrupt, major change to produce a novel influenza A virus subtype 
that was not previously circulating amongst the human population (CDC, 2005). Antigenic shift 
can occur either through direct animal-to-human transmission or through the genetic 
reassortment of human and animal influenza A virus genes (CDC, 2005). The resulting new 
human influenza A virus subtype has the potential to cause a global influenza pandemic if certain 
conditions exist.  
2.4 Pandemics 
2.4.1 Definition of a Pandemic  
An epidemic is a disease outbreak which occurs in one geographical location; however, if the 
disease outbreak spreads globally infecting many people and resulting in high mortality rates, it 
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is referred to as a pandemic (Peiris et al., 2009). Therefore, an influenza pandemic is an outbreak 
caused by a novel influenza A virus subtype that arises in one geographic location, but spreads 
worldwide causing global epidemics at the same time (Fitzgerald, 2009; CPIPHS, 2006; Peiris et 
al., 2009).  
If certain conditions exist, there is a potential for a pandemic to ensue. First, there has to be a 
new influenza A virus arising from a major genetic change, like an antigenic shift (CPIPHS, 
2006). Secondly, the virus has to be able to sustain efficient human-to-human transmission 
(CPIPHS, 2006). Thirdly, the virus has to be virulent enough to cause serious illness and death in 
humans (CPIPHS, 2006). Lastly, the virus has to be introduced into a susceptible population with 
little or no immunity (CPIPHS, 2006). 
2.4.2 World Health Organization Pandemic Alert Phases 
The WHO has developed six pandemic alert phases to guide the pandemic response. In general, 
Phases 1-3 reflect the need for preparedness and Phases 4-6 indicate the need for response 
(WHO, 2011a).  
Table 1. Definitions of World Health Organization‟s Pandemic Alert Phases 
Phase Definition 
Phase 1 No animal virus has been reported to cause human infection.   
Phase 2 A circulating animal virus has been reported to cause human infection.  
Phase 3 A circulating virus has caused clusters of human infection, but has not 
sustained efficient human-to-human transmission in order to cause a 
community-level outbreak. 
Phase 4 A circulating virus has sustained efficient human-to-human transmission 
and is able to cause a community-level outbreak.  
Phase 5 Indicates that a pandemic is imminent. A circulating virus has sustained 
efficient human-to-human transmission in at least two countries in one 
WHO region.  
Phase 6 Indicates a global pandemic. A circulating virus has caused community-
level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region, 
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in addition to the criteria outlined for Phase 5.     
Post-peak period Levels of pandemic disease in most countries are decreasing below peak 
observed levels. Additional waves of the pandemic may still ensue.  
Post-pandemic period Levels of pandemic disease have decreased to normal expected levels.  
Table adapted from WHO, 2011a  
2.4.3 Canadian Activity Levels  
The Canadian activity level indicator is noted after the decimal point of the WHO phase number 
(CPIPHS, 2006). The Canadian activity level reflects the observed activity of a new influenza 
virus specifically in Canada (CPIPHS, 2006).  
Table 2. Definitions of Canadian Activity Levels  
Canadian Activity Level  Definition 
0 No new influenza virus activity is observed in Canada.  
1 Single case(s) of infection is (are) observed in Canada.  
2 Localized or widespread influenza activity is observed in Canada.  
 Table adapted from CPIPHS, 2006 
2.4.4 Previous Pandemics 
Historically, influenza pandemics occur three to four times each century, the number of cases 
usually peak in multiple waves separated by a three to nine month period, and each wave lasts 
about six to eight weeks (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2009). There have been three global influenza 
pandemics prior to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic; all caused by an antigenic shift (Chang 
et al., 2009). From 1918-1919, the “Spanish” influenza was caused by a H1N1 subtype, in which 
25% of the population was infected and resulted in approximately 50 million deaths worldwide 
(Shen, Ma, & Wang, 2009). Specifically in Canada, an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 people died 
during the “Spanish” influenza pandemic (CPIPHS, 2006). However, a majority of individuals 
died during this pandemic due to secondary bacterial pneumonia, since antibiotics were not 
available in 1918 (Taubenberger, Reid, & Fanning, 2000). From 1957-1963, the “Asian” 
influenza was caused by a H2N2 subtype and caused approximately 1.5 million deaths 
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worldwide (Gatherer, 2009). From 1968-1970, the “Hong Kong” influenza was caused by a 
H3N2 subtype and resulted in approximately 1 million deaths worldwide (Gatherer, 2009). 
2.5 The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza 
2.5.1 Background 
In March 2009, an outbreak of a severe acute respiratory infection occurred in Veracruz, Mexico 
(Chang et al., 2009). The cause of human infection and H1N1‟s spread amongst the human 
population is still unknown; more studies need to be conducted to identify molecular markers to 
determine how an animal influenza A virus crossed the species barrier to infect humans (Chang 
et al., 2009).  
H1N1 is a novel influenza A virus subtype that sustained efficient human-to-human 
transmission, has the virulence ability to cause human disease, and a vast amount of the human 
population does not have prior immunity (Wang & Palese, 2009). The 2009 H1N1 pandemic was 
relatively mild since the virus did not contain the known pathogenicity marker, the PB1-F2 
protein (Wang & Palese, 2009; Shen et al., 2009). As of August 1, 2010, more than 214 
countries, overseas territories, and/or communities worldwide had reported laboratory confirmed 
cases of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus, and it caused over 18,449 deaths (WHO, 2011b). 
Canada experienced two distinct waves of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic (PHAC, 2010a). 
The first wave occurred from April 12, 2009 to August 29, 2009, and peak activity was noted in 
early June (PHAC, 2010a). The second wave occurred from August 30, 2009 to January 27, 
2010 during which substantially higher hospitalization and death rates were noted (PHAC, 
2010a). In Canada, there have been at least 426 deaths due to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza 
as of January 28, 2010 (PHAC, 2010b). On August 10, 2010, the WHO declared that we had 
moved into a post-pandemic period, although localized outbreaks were likely to still occur 
(WHO, 2011c). 
 2.5.2 Origin 
As mentioned, influenza A viruses can infect multiple host species, including: birds, humans, 
and pigs (CDC, 2005). Pigs have been suggested to act as a “mixing vessel” for influenza viruses 
due to the presence of both avian and mammalian receptors (Vincent et al., 2009). A single 
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swine has the potential to be dually infected by both avian and human influenza viruses allowing 
for reassortment to occur between the genome of swine, avian, and human viruses (Vincent et 
al., 2009).   
The origin of the novel H1N1 subtype is quite complex considering its genome includes 
segments from prevalent swine, avian, and human influenza viruses. Influenza A viruses of 
H1N1 subtype are all avian in origin; however, multiple viruses have reassorted and antigenic 
drift has occurred amongst the various host species, which has created the current novel H1N1 
influenza virus composed of a genome segment combination that has not been previously 
identified (Chang et al., 2009; Laver et al., 2000; Garten et al., 2009).  
 2.5.3 Populations at Risk, Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Transmission 
Groups at higher risk of getting the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza and related complications 
were similar to those for seasonal influenza (CDC, 2009). However, Aboriginal populations were 
highly impacted (Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010; Spence & White, 2010). Interestingly, the 
H1N1 pandemic influenza virus affected a much younger age demographic since the elderly 
appeared to have some cross-protection due to pre-existing antibodies (Chang et al., 2009; 
Kumar et al., 2009; Peiris et al., 2009; Dawood et al., 2009). 
Common symptoms of mild cases of H1N1 are similar to the symptoms experienced when 
suffering from the seasonal influenza (Chang et al., 2009). Severe cases of H1N1 may cause 
hospitalization, pneumonia, respiratory failure, and sometimes death (Chang et al., 2009). H1N1 
is diagnosed and transmitted in the same fashion as seasonal influenza (Peiris et al., 2009; Wang 
& Palese, 2009).  
 2.5.4 Prevention of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza 
A strain of H1N1 has co-circulated since 1977 and has been included in the annual seasonal 
vaccines (Wang & Palese, 2009; Peiris et al., 2009).  However, there is an antigenic gap between 
the seasonal H1N1 strain and the pandemic H1N1 strain (Peiris et al., 2009). Research has shown 
that vaccination with recent seasonal nonadjuvanted or adjuvanted influenza vaccines induced 
little to no cross-reactive antibody response to the 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain in any age group 
(Hancock et al., 2009).  
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2.5.5 Treatment of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza 
The 2009 H1N1 influenza can be treated with antivirals, similar to how seasonal influenza is 
treated. H1N1 is currently sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors, but resistant to adamantanes 
(Chang et al., 2009). Patients with severe cases of H1N1 may suffer from severe hypoxemia and 
multisystem organ failure (Kumar et al., 2009). These patients may require admittance into an 
intensive care unit, prolonged mechanical ventilation, and the use of lung rescue therapies 
(Kumar et al., 2009).  
2.6 Review of Existing Pandemic Plans (with special emphasis on sections addressing First 
Nations) 
Novel influenza A viruses have the ability to cause high morbidity and mortality rates since most 
of the human population will have little to no immunity to the novel strain (Oshitani, 2006). Data 
has revealed that vulnerable populations (i.e., First Nations) will be disproportionately affected 
by a pandemic situation, thereby exacerbating established social inequalities (WHO, 2009; Lee, 
Rogers, & Braunack-Mayer, 2008). Therefore, ethically addressing the needs of disadvantaged 
populations should be a cornerstone of pandemic planning and the subsequent implementation of 
pandemic plans (Lee et al., 2008). Nations worldwide have created pandemic plans which 
repeatedly exclude general ethical considerations (Kotalik, 2005). Kotalik (2005) reviewed three 
existing national pandemic plans (of Canada, United States of America, and United Kingdom) 
and revealed that these plans have been heavily guided by expert scientists and do not adequately 
address relevant ethical values that should guide the decision-making process of pandemic plans, 
such as, how to allocate scarce resources and implementation of communication strategies. For 
instance, all individuals are affected by a pandemic; however, it appears that certain populations 
have not been involved in the pandemic planning process nor have they been informed of the 
decisions made which will affect them (Kotalik, 2005). Kotalik (2005) states that pandemic plans 
require transparent communication and collaboration of all levels of the government, public 
sector, private sector, and voluntary sector, in addition to every citizen. In order for information 
to be effective, the person must be able to access the information in addition to having the ability 
and resources to comply with the provided information (Lee et al., 2008). In the case of First 
Nation communities, there are issues of if they have access to culturally appropriate information 
and whether the mitigation methods are feasible (Massey et al., 2009). For instance, the control 
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measure of isolation is commonly recommended; however, this strategy may not be feasible in a 
house in which many people reside, which is typical in First Nation communities (Massey et al., 
2009). Therefore, it is imperative that recommended mitigation methods in pandemic plans are 
effective and culturally sensitive in order to increase compliance and reduce virus transmission. 
This section will review existing pandemic plans of the WHO, federal government, provincial 
government, and First Nation communities; special emphasis will be placed on sections which 
address First Nations‟ concerns.    
2.6.1 World Health Organization Guidelines and Checklist, 2005 and 2009  
In light of the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the threat of the 
highly pathogenic H5N1 avian virus, being prepared for a public health emergency is vital in 
order to mitigate the ensuing social and economic disruptions (WHO, 2009). In order to assist 
nations in creating pandemic plans, the WHO provides various guidance reports and checklists 
with invaluable information (WHO, 2009; WHO, 2005). Although WHO acknowledges that 
vulnerable populations will be disproportionately affected by a pandemic (usually due to low 
income), the special concerns of “vulnerable and minority groups” is only briefly mentioned 
(WHO, 2009; WHO, 2005). For instance, it is mentioned that an ethical framework should be 
used to address the needs of various groups, including vulnerable and minority groups (WHO, 
2009). However, the document does not specifically state that nations should be addressing the 
needs of groups who are socially and economically disadvantaged (Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). In 
addition, WHO suggests that during Phase 4, affected countries should “gather feedback from 
the public, vulnerable populations and at-risk groups on attitudes towards the recommended 
measures and barriers affecting their willingness or ability to comply” and use this feedback to 
creak effective communication campaigns (WHO, 2009, p. 42). In general, WHO‟s guidelines 
continue to suggest a universal approach to pandemic planning and do not adequately convey 
how nations can accomplish addressing the concerns of vulnerable populations (WHO, 2009; 
WHO, 2005).  
2.6.2 The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector, 2006 
The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector (CPIPHS) (2006) provides an in-
depth outline of the actions the health sector should take before, during, and after a pandemic 
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with the goal of reducing deaths and societal disruptions in Canada due to an influenza pandemic 
(CPIPHS, 2006). The document applies universal methods which should be revised at the 
community level to address the concerns of the local people (CPIPHS, 2006). Annex B, entitled 
“Pandemic Influenza Planning Considerations in On-reserve First Nation Communities”, 
describes some comments specifically addressing First Nation communities which are 
recommended to be taken into consideration during the planning process (CPIPHS, 2006). The 
CPIPHS states that federal, provincial, and territorial governments are responsible for providing 
health services to First Nation and Inuit populations (CPIPHS, 2006). However, Health Canada‟s 
First Nations and Inuit Branch (FNIHB) is responsible for delivering health services to remote 
isolated, isolated, and semi-isolated on-reserve First Nation communities (CPIPHS, 2006). These 
communities are responsible for creating their own community pandemic plans with the support 
of FNIHB and provincial health authorities (CPIPHS 2006). Therefore, the CPIPHS provides a 
table outlining proposed activities and responsibilities for relevant jurisdictions (CPIPHS, 2006). 
Although progress has been made in addressing the needs of First Nation communities in a 
pandemic influenza situation, there remain gaps in the informal collaborations (i.e., adequate 
surveillance and communication) that have occurred between Health Canada‟s FNIHB and 
provincial governments (CPIPHS, 2006). However, the CPIPHS claims that formal arrangements 
are in place to ensure equitable access of First Nation communities to vaccines, antivirals, and 
emergency equipment (CPIPHS, 2006). Six components of pandemic preparedness are 
concentrated on, including: surveillance, vaccine programs, antivirals, health services emergency 
planning, public health measures, and communications (CPIPHS, 2006). These six issues will be 
outlined including comments of whether considerations for remote and isolated First Nation 
communities were incorporated.    
Influenza surveillance is particularly important during a pandemic in order to monitor the virus‟s 
impact, including vital laboratory surveillance of the virus‟s antigenic drift and shift (CPIPHS, 
2006). The PHAC manages the national surveillance system, entitled FluWatch (CPIPHS, 2006). 
It is vital for pandemic planners of First Nation communities to be aware of provincial laboratory 
testing guidelines including where and how specimens should be sent (CPIPHS, 2006).  
After the pandemic virus strain has been identified and a vaccine has been developed, 
vaccinating the entire population will be a primary action (CPIPHS, 2006). Jurisdictions are 
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encouraged to follow national recommendations on priority groups since initial vaccine 
production will not be sufficient to vaccinate the entire population (CPIPHS, 2006). During the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, national authorities recommended First Nation populations as a 
priority group since they may be socially and economically disadvantaged, have numerous risk 
factors, and have limited access to health care (PHAC, 2009). Local, regional, provincial, and 
federal levels of government are responsible for ensuring that First Nation communities receive 
timely and equitable distribution of the vaccine once it is available (CPIPHS, 2006). With 
regards to remote First Nation communities, the CPIPHS states that pandemic planners of these 
communities need to consider how they will receive, store, and administer the vaccine (CPIPHS, 
2006).  
Since it may take up to five months before a vaccine is available due to the time required to 
identify the virus strain and amount of antigen needed, antivirals are effective as prophylaxis and 
treatment of influenza (CPIPHS, 2006). Canada has established a National Antiviral Stockpile in 
order to provide antiviral treatment for citizens (CPIPHS, 2006). It has been confirmed that First 
Nation communities meeting the criteria will have access to the National Antiviral Stockpile; 
however, First Nation communities themselves are responsible for the proper distribution of 
antivirals within their community (CPIPHS, 2006). The CPIPHS states that all government levels 
should address the feasibility of establishing an antiviral stockpile in remote and remote-isolated 
First Nation communities in order to ensure timely and equitable access to treatment for people 
who meet the criteria (CPIPHS, 2006).  
FNIHB is responsible for providing or funding health care services for First Nation communities 
(CPIPHS, 2006). The CPIPHS provides some helpful mitigation strategies to address the unique 
considerations of First Nation community pandemic planning (CPIPHS, 2006). First of all, it is 
recommended that planners maintain respect for the traditional knowledge and culture of First 
Nation communities in order to create an effective pandemic plan (CPIPHS, 2006). Secondly, 
remote First Nation communities have the potential to suffer from lack of access to care and 
resources; therefore, planners are encouraged to find possible solutions, such as nearby First 
Nation communities working together in a mutually beneficial manner (CPIPHS, 2006). Thirdly, 
First Nation community planners are encouraged to familiarize themselves with their Medical 
Officer of Health, who may be a helpful resource during a pandemic (CPIPHS, 2006). Fourthly, 
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it is advised that pandemic planners are acutely aware of their community‟s access to health care 
services and their respective safety standards since it varies across the nation (CPIPHS, 2006). In 
addition, establishing alternative care sites may be required by some First Nation communities in 
order to treat an influx of patients; therefore, this possibility should be addressed by planners 
(CPIPHS, 2006). Furthermore, some patients may need to be transferred to acute care hospitals; 
therefore, planners should be aware of proper infection control precautions and alternative 
options if transportation is not possible (CPIPHS, 2006). Fifthly, during a pandemic situation, 
there is a high potential to have a lack of health care workers; therefore, the CPIPHS 
recommends that pandemic planners have mitigation strategies in place, such as teaching self-
assessments which can be performed at home and looking for alternative sources of health care 
workers (CPIPHS, 2006). Sixthly, during a pandemic, there may be a possible influx of First 
Nation community members seeking to visit or take care of family, practice cultural traditions, 
and receive access to health care services; therefore, this issue should be addressed by pandemic 
planners (CPIPHS, 2006; Groom et al., 2009). Lastly, considering the geographical location of 
some First Nation communities, transportation of supplies may become increasingly difficult 
during a pandemic; therefore, planners are urged to negotiate contracts with transportation 
services (CPIPHS, 2006).  
Public health measures recommended by the CPIPHS during a pandemic include voluntary self-
isolation, school/workplace closures, and cancellation of public gatherings (CPIPHS, 2006). 
However, there is no mention of whether these measures are effective and feasible in remote and 
isolated First Nation communities.   
Public communication will be vital during a pandemic in order for citizens to be well informed 
of the situation and how to properly respond (CPIPHS, 2006). The CPIPHS states that national 
communication strategies focus on “developing communications that are based on a solid 
understanding of what people know about pandemic influenza, what they do not know, and what 
they want and need to know” (CPIPHS, 2006, section three-preparedness p. 19). However, there 
is no mention of whether these communication strategies are culturally sensitive and accessible 
for members of remote and isolated First Nation communities.  
With regards to First Nation communities, the CPIPHS also addresses issues of proper infection 
control practices and culturally respectful burials (CPIPHS, 2006). Infection control practices 
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such as hand washing, use of personal protective equipment (PPE), and proper cough etiquette 
are encouraged for all citizens, including members of First Nation communities (CPIPHS, 2006). 
During a pandemic, local authorities will have to deal with an increase in deaths due to 
influenza; therefore, attendance to funerals may be restricted as an infection control measure 
(CPIPHS, 2006). The CPIPHS states that it is the responsibility of the Medical Officer of Health 
to determine if restrictions on large social gatherings are necessary and effective (CPIPHS, 
2006). Furthermore, since First Nation people have special directives for funeral services, the 
CPIPHS claims that local authorities can communicate with Band Councils (i.e., the elected local 
governments of First Nations) in these situations to receive culturally appropriate information 
(CPIPHS, 2006). The CPIPHS addresses that transporting bodies to their burial location may be 
an issue for “northern and isolated communities”; therefore, planners are recommended to take 
into consideration the lack of funeral resources and potential transportation difficulties (CPIPHS, 
2006).  
In general, the CPIPHS devotes a well-intentioned annex to addressing the needs of First Nation 
communities; however, little specific detail is provided on how to attain the numerous lofty 
proposed goals and considerations (CPIPHS, 2006).  
2.6.3 The Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic, 2008  
The Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (OHPIP) aims to reduce the “morbidity and 
mortality associated with influenza pandemics” and includes a chapter entitled “Guidelines for 
First Nations Communities” (OHPIP, 2008). The OHPIP states that during a pandemic, it is 
assumed that rural, remote, or isolated First Nation communities may experience disruption of 
health care services and resources (i.e., antivirals, vaccines, etc.) due to transportation 
difficulties, in addition to having to use available technology to the fullest in order to 
communicate and access information (OHPIP, 2008).  
In this chapter issues of surveillance, health human resources, antivirals and vaccine, supplies 
and equipment stockpiles, influenza centres/alternate care sites, communications, and 
transportation are discussed (OHPIP, 2008). FNIHB developed a surveillance system which 
monitors influenza-like illness (ILI) (i.e., acute onset of respiratory illness with fever, cough, and 
either sore throat, joint pain, muscle pain, and/or physical weakness) for all First Nation 
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communities and reports information to the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) 
(OHPIP, 2008; CPIPHS, 2006). With regards to health human resources, FNIHB is currently 
working with First Nation communities to develop a pandemic health human resources plan, 
which will clearly outline health care workers who will provide health care during a pandemic 
(OHPIP, 2008). During a pandemic, the OHPIP is aiming for equitable access to antivirals and 
vaccines for First Nation communities (OHPIP, 2008). The province is responsible for 
distributing antivirals to FNIHB, who in turn will distribute the antivirals to First Nation 
communities (OHPIP, 2008). The First Nation communities are responsible for developing plans 
to properly store and distribute antivirals (OHPIP, 2008). The OHPIP states that timely 
distribution of antivirals to isolated First Nation communities may be difficult; therefore, 
MOHLTC has provided FNIHB with a small stockpile of antivirals which FNIHB may distribute 
immediately to First Nation communities requiring them (OHPIP, 2008). First Nation 
community members will be able to access vaccines through their local public health units and 
hospitals and their staff will be responsible for properly storing and distributing the vaccines 
(OHPIP, 2008). With regards to stockpiling equipment (i.e., N95 respirators, gowns, gloves, 
etc.), FNIHB is responsible for providing First Nation communities with a four-week supply 
(OHPIP, 2008). MOHLTC will have an additional four-week supply of equipment which is 
available for First Nation communities (OHPIP, 2008). As for establishing influenza 
centres/alternative care sites, FNIHB is collaborating with First Nation communities to choose 
places which would be suitable to act as alternate care site to provide additional health care 
services during a pandemic; however, funding had not yet been secured at the time of this report 
(OHPIP, 2008). The OHPIP claims that First Nation communities will have equitable access to 
information with the help of FNIHB (OHPIP, 2008). Lastly, the OHPIP acknowledges that some 
remote First Nation communities are dependent on air transport to transfer equipment and ill 
patients; therefore, FNIHB is responsible for paying costs of additional transportation needs and 
negotiating appropriate contracts (OHPIP, 2008).     
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2.6.4 Ministry of Health and Long Term Care - Guidance on Public Health 
Measures for the Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus in First Nation Communities, 
2009  
The MOHLTC also published a document to help guide First Nation communities (MOHLTC, 
2009). The document clearly states that First Nation communities are at a higher risk of 
receiving H1N1 due to health conditions (i.e., diabetes, pregnancy, etc.), age demographics (i.e., 
46% of Ontario‟s Aboriginal population are under the age of 25 years old), environmental 
conditions (i.e., crowded housing, lack of access to clean water, etc.), and social factors (i.e., 
travel, large social gatherings, etc.) (MOHLTC, 2009). Therefore, MOHLTC suggests some 
public health measures for First Nation communities including proper hand washing, cough 
etiquette, isolation of sick people (either within a room in a house or at an alternative care site if 
available), alternative sleeping arrangements, identifying a sole caregiver for sick people, and 
sick people wearing a surgical mask or an alternative to reduce virus transmission (MOHLTC, 
2009). In addition, people are encouraged to regularly clean their houses, stockpile equipment 
(i.e., cleaning supplies, tissues, etc.), cancel large social gatherings (MOHLTC provides a tool 
to help the Band Council decide if this is necessary), and take care of children (especially if 
schools are closed) (MOHLTC, 2009).  
2.6.5 First Nations and Inuit Health Branch – Ontario Region: Pandemic Influenza 
Plan, 2006 
The First Nations and Inuit Health Branch – Ontario Region Pandemic Influenza Plan (FNIHB-
OR PIP) outlines aspects of the Ontario Region‟s influenza pandemic response (FNIHB-OR PIP, 
2006). The document covers topics such as: pandemic influenza, pandemic planning, roles and 
responsibilities, and components of preparedness and response. A chapter is dedicated to 
outlining the roles and responsibilities of the federal government, MOHLTC, local health units, 
FNIHB-OR, and local First Nation communities during three phases (i.e., pre-pandemic, 
pandemic, and post-pandemic) (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). Each phase is organized according to 
seven components of preparedness and response (i.e., surveillance, vaccine, antivirals and 
antibiotics, health services, emergency response, public health measures, communications).  
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FNIHB-OR updated the July 2006 pandemic influenza plan in October 2009; however, the 
former version will be reviewed since the community-level pandemic plan of each study 
community closely resembles it (FNIHB-OR, 2006). The actions recommended for local First 
Nation communities in the FNIHB-OR PIP will be reviewed followed by the revisions that were 
made in each study community‟s pandemic plan prior to February 9, 2010, when my research 
commenced.    
The FNIHB-OR PIP outlines the actions local First Nation communities should take prior, during 
and after a pandemic (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). Prior to a pandemic, various people (i.e., 
physicians, nurses, band staff, etc.) are responsible for reporting ILI data to FNIHB (FNIHB-OR 
PIP, 2006). The Band Council is responsible for estimating the population size of the 
community, while physicians and nurses are mainly responsible for organizing the mass 
immunization clinic (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). With regards to antivirals and antibiotics, health 
care personnel (i.e., physicians and nurses) are responsible for developing a list of community 
members who meet the criteria for antiviral treatment and identifying a secure location for 
antivirals to be stored (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). Various people (i.e., physicians, nurses, band 
staff, etc.) are responsible for developing human resource contingency plans, determining which 
health services are considered essential, planning for alternate care sites, and creating equipment 
lists for health facilities (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). Nurses are also given the responsibility of 
providing self-care training (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). With regards to emergency response, 
physicians, nurses, and Band staff (i.e., health director, community health representatives, etc.) 
are responsible for developing and revising community emergency preparedness and response 
plans (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). The community spiritual leaders are mainly responsible for 
developing a corpse storage plan along with identifying a temporary morgue site in the 
community (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). The Band Council is to ensure that business continuity 
plans are in place for services provided within the community, such as, non-medical 
transportation and social services (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). The Band Council is mainly 
responsible for the implementation of public health measures within the community, while 
physicians and nurses are primarily responsible for promoting infection control practices within 
health care settings (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). The Band Council is also primarily responsible for 
developing a communication plan which will be executed if a pandemic is declared (FNIHB-OR 
PIP, 2006).  
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During a pandemic, surveillance of ILI cases in the community will be increased (FNIHB-OR 
PIP, 2006). Once vaccines are available, physicians and nurses are to commence the mass 
immunization clinic, monitor uptake levels, and report any adverse effects (FNIHB-OR PIP, 
2006). Physicians and nurses are responsible for monitoring the availability, demand, 
distribution, uptake, and adverse effects of antivirals in the community (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). 
Physicians, nurses, and band staff are required to activate human resource contingency plans, 
maintain the provision of essential health services, and establish an alternate care site if needed 
(FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). The Band Council is mainly responsible for the emergency response by 
activating the emergency preparedness and response plans and business continuity plans within 
the community (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). Physicians, nurses, and Band staff are to implement 
public health measures, such as isolation and closures (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006). And the 
community is to designate a spokesperson who will inform the community about the pandemic 
response (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006).    
After a pandemic, it is recommended that communities resume routine activities (FNIHB-OR 
PIP, 2006). All plans (i.e., mass immunization clinic protocols, human resource contingency 
plans, etc.) are to be evaluated and revised as needed (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006).  
2.6.6 Community-Level Pandemic Plans of Fort Albany, Attawapiskat, and 
Kashechewan (as of February 9, 2010)   
Although the study communities‟ pandemic plans closely resembled FNIHB-OR PIP (2006), 
some revisions were made prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response which differed. For 
instance, in some cases, community-based people were designated and appropriate locations for 
activities were identified. The Fort Albany First Nation Pandemic Plan (FAFNPP) and the 
Kashechewan First Nation Pandemic Plan (KFNPP) included a page entitled “Areas to consider 
for business continuity planning for each Band program” which contained a list of issues that 
should be addressed, for example, that psychological support for employees should be arranged 
(FAFNPP, 2006; KFNPP, 2009). In addition, prior to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the 
health director of Fort Albany First Nation developed the Peetabeck Health Services Pandemic 
Plan (PHSPP), a pandemic plan specifically for the federally funded health center (PHSPP, 
2009). The PHSPP included frameworks for ordering influenza pandemic supplies, 
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responsibilities of the outbreak control team, a list of self-care training topics (to be provided by 
nurses), and methods of distributing health information to community members (PHSPP, 2009).  
The aforementioned community-level pandemic plans included recommendations provided by 
the CPIPHS, OHPIP, and FNIHB-OR PIP; however, some vital details are not included. For 
instance, the pandemic plans lacked community emergency preparedness and response plans and 
corpse storage plans. Also, it was noted that the Attawapiskat First Nation Pandemic Plan 
(AFNPP) excluded all of the post-pandemic phase components except for communications; and 
the KFNPP omitted one post-pandemic phase section (i.e., antivirals and antibiotics) (AFNPP, 















CHAPTER 3: THE 2009 H1N1 PANDEMIC RESPONSE IN REMOTE FIRST NATION 
COMMUNITIES OF SUB-ARCTIC ONTARIO: BARRERIS AND IMPROVEMENTS 
FROM A HEALTH CARE SERVICS PERSPECTIVE  
3.0 Overview   
Objective: To retrospectively examine the barriers faced and opportunities for improvement 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response experienced by participants responsible for the 
delivery of health care services in three remote and isolated sub-arctic First Nation communities 
of northern Ontario, Canada.  
Study design: A qualitative community-based participatory approach.  
Methods: Semi-directed interviews were conducted with adult key informants (n=13) using 
purposive sampling of participants representing the three main sectors responsible for health care 
services (i.e., federal health centers, provincial hospitals, and Band Councils). Data were 
manually transcribed and coded using deductive and inductive thematic analysis.  
Results: Primary barriers reported were issues with overcrowding in houses, insufficient human 
resources, and inadequate community awareness. Main areas for improvement included 
increasing human resources (i.e., nurses and trained health care professionals), funding for 
supplies, and general community awareness regarding disease processes and prevention.  
Conclusions: Government bodies should consider focusing efforts to provide more support in 
terms of human resources, monies, and education. In addition, various government organizations 
should collaborate to improve housing conditions and timely access to resources. These 
recommendations should be addressed in future pandemic plans, so that remote western James 
Bay First Nation communities of sub-arctic Ontario and other similar communities can be better 






The 2009 H1N1 influenza, caused by a novel influenza A virus subtype, quickly spread 
worldwide causing the first global pandemic declaration in over four decades (Chang et al., 
2009). Reports have shown that Canada‟s First Nations population were disproportionately 
impacted by the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus, especially remote communities (Kermode-Scott, 
2009; Barker, 2010). A “remote” community is defined as one located over 350 kilometers from 
the nearest service centre having year-round road access; while, an “isolated” community is only 
accessible by planes year-round (CPIPHS, 2006).  
People living in remote and isolated First Nation communities were faced with unique challenges 
during the pandemic which must be addressed by pandemic planners (Groom et al., 2009). In 
remote First Nation communities, federal, provincial, and First Nations governments share 
responsibility for the delivery of health care services (CPIPHS, 2006). Inadequate social policies 
and insufficient federal funding have negatively impacted primary health care services, 
community level surveillance, and housing in First Nation communities (Webster, 2009). 
Although living in an isolated community may initially act as a buffer with respect to exposure to 
an infectious disease, if a pathogen is introduced into an isolated community, the living 
conditions (e.g., overcrowded housing, impoverished lifestyle) appears to promote virus 
transmission (Groom et al., 2009). Additionally, transportation of supplies and resources may be 
limited, and can be especially challenging in harsh weather conditions (OHPIP, 2008). 
Moreover, there are vulnerable populations within First Nation communities who suffer from 
various co-morbidities (e.g., diabetes, obesity), placing them at greater risk of becoming infected 
by a novel pathogen (Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010).  
It is critical that governments address the concerns of economically and socially disadvantaged 
groups in order to mitigate the injustice that may occur during a public health emergency 
(Uscher-Pines et al., 2007). To the point, in Canada, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) has 
noted that there has been very little inclusion of First Nations‟ input into current federal and 
provincial pandemic plans (AFN, 2005).  
The purpose of the present paper is to retrospectively examine the barriers encountered by three 
geographically remote and isolated First Nation communities during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
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response from a health care perspective; and identify culturally appropriate opportunities for 
improvement informed by participants, which should be incorporated into future pandemic plans.  
3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Study Community Profiles  
The three study communities are located in the western James Bay region of northern Ontario 
with on-reserve population sizes estimated at 850, 1,700, and 1,800, respectively (Ruby 
Edwards-Wheesk, pers. comm., 2010). These three First Nations were chosen for this study since 
all are remote and isolated being located in one geographical region (Figure 1), with similar 
living conditions (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), 2010a; INAC, 2010b). In 
addition, community-based health care providers felt that existing pandemic plans did not 
properly address their communities‟ unique conditions.  
Each First Nation (or Band) is governed by an elected Chief and Council. All three communities 
have a federally-funded health centre for community public health and a primary health care 
facility covered by 24-hour nursing care. Two communities have a wing of a provincial hospital; 
while, the third community has a federal nursing station. Although these primary care facilities 
have selected medical equipment, any patients requiring surgery or care beyond the capabilities 
of the nursing staff must be transported to the nearest accommodating facility (Tsuji, 1998). 
3.2.2 Study Population 
Using purposive sampling, participants (n=13) were chosen by the researchers who had the 
authority to represent the three government sectors (i.e., federal, provincial, and First Nations) 
responsible for making decisions and implementing each study community‟s pandemic response 
from a health services perspective (Neuman & Robson, 2009). The health director manages the 
federal health center, while the nurses-in-charge and community health nurses are responsible for 
a wide variety of health care activities, including immunizations. The director of patient care is 
in charge of the provincial hospital wing and the clinical coordinator is responsible for managing 
primary care activities of front line health care workers, such as, dispensing of antiviral 
treatment. The community with a nursing station has a nurse-in-charge who has a similar role as 
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the clinical coordinator. Lastly, the Band Council has the ultimate decision making power when 
responding to a pandemic; chosen participants included the elected Chief and/or deputy Chief. 
Figure 1. Location of remote and isolated communities of western James Bay, northern Ontario, 
Canada.  
 
3.2.3 Community-based Participatory Approach 
This research can be described as a community-based participatory approach, as it directly 
involved First Nation community members and allowed for the finding and implementation of 
culturally appropriate and relevant solutions (Davis & Reid, 1999; Macaulay et al., 1998). A 
community-based advisory group was formed of five participants representing the communities‟ 
health centers and Band Councils to ensure the study met the needs of the communities and was 
conducted in a culturally appropriate manner. The community-based advisory group actively 
collaborated with the authors to develop the study‟s objectives, design, interview questions and 
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protocols. In addition, they validated the results and aided in disseminating the study‟s findings. 
Ethics clearance was granted through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo.  
3.2.4 Data Collection 
Qualitative data were collected by semi-directive interviews with 13 adult key informants during 
the period February 9 to 23, 2010, after community illness rates returned to baseline levels, thus 
participants had a period of time to reflect on their community‟s pandemic response. Being 
culturally appropriate for the western James Bay region, verbal informed consent was obtained 
and interview questions were vetted through the community-based advisory group (Skinner, 
Hanning, & Tsuji, 2006; Kirby, Lévesque, Wabano, & Robertson-Wilson, 2007). Semi-directive 
interviews were used to gain an in-depth understanding of interviewees‟ perspectives (Neuman 
& Robson, 2009). To encourage elaboration, questions were open-ended and frequent probes 
were used (Minore et al., 2005). The interview questions were developed based on academic 
literatures of health care service aspects of a pandemic response, including questions about 
identifying positive aspects, barriers faced and opportunities for improvements. For the 
participants‟ convenience, interviews were done at their chosen place and time, and individual 
interviews lasted from approximately 15 minutes to 1.5 hours. The interviews were in English 
and audio recorded with permission of the participant, with notes also being taken.   
3.2.5 Data Analyses 
Transcribing, coding, categorizing, and analysis of the data was conducted by the author (NAC) 
and confirmed by the co-author (LJST). Data from the interviews were manually transcribed 
verbatim into electronic format. Codes were created using deductive and inductive thematic 
analysis. This combination approach allowed for the use of “theory-driven” codes derived from 
previous research and “data-driven” codes which emerged from the raw data itself (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). During deductive coding, a template organizing approach was employed 
which utilized the framework outlined in the existing regional FNIHB pandemic influenza plan 
as a coding template (FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Seven broad codes were 
used as a template to organize similar segments of data and provide a flexible guide for 
subsequent analysis and interpretation (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Crabtree & Miller, 
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1999). Inductive coding was used for data that described a new code which emerged from the 
data (Boyatzis, 1998). For instance, segments of data regarding supplies and equipment were 
previously coded as health services; however, after reviewing the participant‟s interview 
transcripts, supplies emerged as a separate code. The data within each of the resulting eight 
codes was further categorized according to interview trigger questions (i.e., positive aspects, 
barriers faced, and suggested improvements), always noting which community and health sector 
the commenting participant represented (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). This approach 
allowed for the data to be analyzed revealing connections and overarching themes regarding the 
similarities and differences experienced during the pandemic response within and between each 
community. The data analysis was an iterative process and was completed several times to 
ensure accuracy.    
The resulting eight codes were presented in paper format and verbally validated (no subsequent 
changes were proposed) by each community‟s pandemic committee, which comprised of 
representatives (8 to 10 people attended) from various sectors involved in the community‟s 
pandemic response: Band Council, health center, James Bay General Hospital (JBGH), 
education, clergy, Northern store, water treatment plant, and emergency medical services. This 
method of validating the resulting codes beyond the interviewed participants (although their 
respective sectors maintained representation during the community pandemic committee 
meeting) was employed because the theory and data-informed codes would subsequently 
comprise the framework for each community‟s modified community-level pandemic plan 
thereby directly applying the study‟s findings (Sandelowski, 1997).  
3.3 Results  
The details of six codes (e.g., vaccine, antivirals, health services, supplies, public health 
measures, and communications) are presented, as two codes (e.g., surveillance and emergency 
response) were selectively omitted to allow for the presentation of the most relevant results in the 
present paper. Representative quotes were used to accurately reflect participants‟ tone and views; 
however, for confidentiality purposes, which community and health sector a participant 





Participants from all of the communities reported that enough doses of the vaccine were received 
and good uptake rates were noted in their respective community. One community reported an 
estimated pandemic vaccine uptake rate of 80 percent, significantly higher than Canada‟s 
estimated rate of between 40 and 45 percent (PHAC, 2010a). However, a community had 
experienced an influenza outbreak prior to receiving the pandemic H1N1 vaccine.  
Participants from two communities expressed that their communities‟ mass immunization clinic 
(MIC) went smoothly. For instance, one of these communities was sent three support workers 
from Health Canada and implemented a modified immunization certification course to train 
additional health care personnel to vaccinate. In addition, all workers donned personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and patients with influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms were separated and 
given surgical masks.  
However, one community‟s participants revealed that they experienced issues with their MIC. 
For instance, there was a lack of human resources (i.e., trained nurses and auxiliary staff); thus, 
the nurses who were vaccinating fell ill due to exhaustion and not having adequate time to don 
PPE. It was suggested that additional human resources should be secured by providing training 
for community members to act as auxiliary staff (i.e., crowd control, security, etc.), which would 
free the nurses from other tasks and allow them the opportunity to solely concentrate on 
vaccinating. Participants also requested that training be provided to nurses to be able to perform 
immunizations and deploy nurses capable of vaccinating to their community to help at the next 
MIC. In addition, since the nurses were not provided with information on how to properly run a 
MIC, it became a harsh learning experience; a simulation would be helpful prior to the next MIC.  
3.3.2 Antivirals 
Participants from all three communities believed that they received enough doses of antivirals. 
However, the more timely distribution of antivirals was an issue. Also, some participants 




… the first bunch we received, I was surprised the expiry date was a month and a half 
after we receive[d] it … (Participant #8).   
3.3.3 Health Services 
Participants from all three communities felt there was a lack of human resources during their 
pandemic response; their health care facilities were short-staffed and staff felt overworked. A 
participant mentioned that,  
... we were left to do everything on our own … (Participant #1).  
Also, a participant believed that they would not have been able to cope and provide adequate 
patient care if their community had been more severely impacted by the pandemic. In addition, a 
participant noted that there was a lack of trained health care personnel and equipment in the 
communities, especially for severely ill patients requiring mechanical ventilation.  
With regards to an alternate care site (ACS), all three communities discussed the possibility and 
feasibility of opening one which would function as a satellite center providing necessary health 
services. In all communities, various possible locations for an ACS were suggested. However, 
some participants stated that funding and human resources required to open an ACS must be 
secured prior to the next pandemic alert.    
3.3.4 Supplies  
Participants from all communities felt that their communities‟ health facilities (i.e., health centres 
and JBGH) had an adequate amount of supplies for their pandemic response. Nevertheless, one 
community‟s health centre chartered in a plane with supplies (i.e., masks, gowns, gloves and 
hand sanitizers) paid out from their own capital, since their allotted resources from FNIHB did 
not arrive in a timely manner. Several participants experienced further challenges with receiving 
supplies in a timely fashion, which brought up issues of how supplies, especially food, can be 
adequately stockpiled ahead of time, especially if transportation was compromised.  
Also, most participants believed that there was a lack of funding for supplies and provision of 
supplies, especially surgical masks and hand sanitizers, for the community itself. One participant 
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reported that instead of receiving needed hand sanitizers, the community received body bags. 
The participant felt that,  
… the government of Canada doesn’t want to help the Native people … because it was 
cheaper … to send 500 body bags (Participant #11).   
Some participants felt that it was unfair that community members were obligated to purchase 
individual infection control supplies, since this proved to be especially difficult for low income 
families. Participants from each community expressed that they would like infection control 
supplies to be provided for the community and that there should be funding in place to purchase 
supplies for the next emergency; as one participant mentioned,  
… a fund or some kind of formal arrangement in a pandemic, First Nation communities 
are always vulnerable to begin with because you’re isolated … (Participant #5).   
3.3.5 Public Health Measures 
Each community agreed that overcrowding in houses was an issue since it may promote virus 
transmission and it was not feasible to segregate ill family members. Therefore, in some ways, 
overcrowding in houses made it difficult for community members to follow recommended public 
health guidelines.  
Some additional issues were reported with respect to following isolation recommendations in 
that ill health-care workers sent home to isolate themselves were subsequently seen out in the 
community even though community gatherings had been cancelled. However, in general, most 
participants reported that community infection control measures were followed within the 
community despite the fact that some complained the measures were unnecessary. For instance, 
people wore surgical masks, avoided handshakes and stockpiled supplies (if available) when 
directed. Additionally, participants reported that modifying cultural practices at funeral services, 
such as limiting attendance and avoiding physical contact (i.e., hugging and kissing), was 






All three communities formed a community pandemic committee. All participants from one 
community believed that their pandemic committee encompassed a team approach by 
collaborating and cooperating, which led to effective communication. However, two 
communities‟ participants suggested that more support and participation from all key players 
would have been beneficial in order to develop and implement community wide 
recommendations, especially during the early stages of pandemic preparation. Additionally, a 
participant suggested that receiving feedback from the pandemic committee would be valuable to 
ensure that all members comprehended the subsequent actions to be taken. One participant 
stated,  
… we needed cooperation from the leadership, and also from the people to start taking 
things seriously … (Participant #13).  
Nevertheless, some participants reported good communication within their respective 
organizations. For instance, a participant commented that weekly teleconferences were helpful, 
as additional information was provided and questions answered. Participants also reported that 
they were in constant communication with their neighbouring coastal communities to share 
information and provide support in a mutually beneficial manner.   
A majority of participants stated that they received information from multiple media sources 
(i.e., internet, television, radio) which were misleading at times. Specifically, participants felt 
that the media attention sensationalized the pandemic resulting in unnecessary hype and panic in 
their communities. Additionally, a participant stated that the information received was too 
generalized to be helpful in the context of living in a remote community. The participant 
questioned,  
 
… that’s a lot of information, but at the same time, is it geared here to the community or 
is it geared to somewhere else? (Participant #1).  
 
Participants from all communities felt there was a general lack of community awareness during 
the pandemic even though various dissemination strategies, such as, radio, posters, and/or 
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pamphlets were employed. For instance, some community members did not understand the 
disease process of influenza, effects of the pandemic vaccine, and importance of community 
infection control measures. All participants agreed that more education and awareness are 
required to be better prepared. 
 
In summary, although each community‟s participants emphasized various concerns, common 
positive aspects, barriers faced, and opportunities for improvement regarding all study 
communities‟ pandemic response were identified (Table 3). 
3.4 Discussion  
In general, remote and isolated First Nation communities possess several distinct characteristics 
which affected their pandemic response, such as, geospatial isolation, living conditions, culture, 
and governance. The results of this qualitative study helped to inform the following 
recommendations for government officials to address in order to improve these and similar 
communities‟ health sector pandemic response (Table 4).  
 
 
Table 3. Positive aspects, barriers faced, and opportunities for improvement regarding the 
pandemic response in three remote and isolated First Nations communities. 
Positive Aspects         Barriers                       Opportunities for Improvement 
Vaccine           Public Health Measures           Supplies 
-Good uptake                                 -Overcrowding in houses         -More funding 
-Received enough doses 
 
Antivirals          Health Services                         Health Services  
-Received enough doses                -Lack of human resources        -More human resources 
 
Supplies           Communication                        Communication 






Table 4. Participants‟ suggested recommendations and additional considerations for government 
officials to address for future pandemic plans.  
Participants‟ recommendations  
- Distribute resources (i.e., vaccines, antivirals, supplies) in a timely fashion  
- Provide additional supplies for community use 
- Establish an emergency fund  
- Recruit nursing staff  
- Deploy interdisciplinary team of health care professionals   
- Secure funding and human resources for alternate care site 
- Implement disease awareness education sessions  
- Deliver more regional and community specific information  
Additional considerations  
- First Nations and Inuit Health Branch (federal organization) and Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care (provincial organization) should re-evaluate resource distribution plans  
- First Nations and Inuit Health Branch should collaborate with the communities  
to develop a food supply plan  
- Improve housing conditions  
- Declare pandemic committee meetings mandatory 
 
3.4.1 Distribute resources in a timely fashion 
In general, participants believed that distributing resources (i.e., vaccines, antivirals, and 
pandemic supplies) in a timely fashion needs to be improved upon.  
Some participants believed that vaccines were not timely distributed to their communities, 
although they received an adequate amount. Vaccination is the best way to prevent influenza 
related complications; however, the development of a pandemic vaccine could take up to five 
months after the strain has been identified (OHPIP, 2008; Sullivan, Jacobson, Dowdle, & Poland, 
2010). Therefore, research focusing on increasing the pace and capacity of pandemic vaccine 
development and production should be a priority (Fedson, 2003). Once the pandemic vaccine is 
available, it is the responsibility of all government levels to ensure First Nation communities 
receive a timely and equitable distribution (CPIPHS, 2006).   
Additionally, a timely distribution of antivirals continues to be an ongoing global challenge 
(Leung & Nicoll, 2010). Considering geographically remote and isolated areas are difficult to 
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access and transport supplies to, special care should be taken to ensure these communities do not 
receive shipments of antivirals with relatively short expiry dates (OHPIP, 2008).  
While all communities stated their health facilities had enough supplies, these supplies (i.e., 
masks, gowns, gloves, and eye protection) were sometimes not distributed in a timely fashion to 
the region. FNIHB and the MOHLTC are responsible for ensuring that health facilities in First 
Nation communities have a continuous stockpile of pandemic supplies (OHPIP, 2008). In 
addition, FNIHB should work in collaboration with remote First Nation communities to develop 
a plan of how food supplies can be adequately transported and stockpiled during a pandemic. 
Therefore, we suggest that all government levels collaborate to re-evaluate resource distribution 
plans, so remote First Nation communities receive needed resources in a timely fashion (OHPIP, 
2008).  
3.4.2 Increase funding for disease outbreaks  
It is the responsibility of provincial ministries and federal departments to provide supplies for 
workers who provide critical infrastructure services (OHPIP, 2008). However, all communities 
felt there was an inadequate amount of supplies for their community. In agreement with previous 
studies (Massey et al., 2009), some participants stated certain households could not afford 
supplies. Participants suggest that government officials focuses efforts on providing additional 
supplies to First Nation communities and establish an emergency fund that can be accessed to 
purchase supplies for disease outbreaks.   
3.4.3 Increase human resources 
Health Canada‟s FNIHB is responsible for delivering public and primary health care services (if 
provincial services are not available) to remote and isolated First Nation communities (CPIPHS, 
2006). However, studies have shown that geographically isolated First Nation communities have 
less access to health care services and experience shortages of trained health care professionals 
(MacMillan, MacMillan, Offord, & Dingle, 1996). Being geographically remote and isolated 
presents a barrier to recruiting and retaining nurses in these communities; additionally, studies 
have shown that high turnaround rates of nursing staff can pose negative effects on the provision 
of health services (Minore et al., 2005; Minore, Boone, & Hill, 2004). Nurses are the main 
38 
 
providers of primary-care in these communities; therefore, FNIHB and JBGH should continue to 
focus efforts on recruiting a full-time, permanent complement of nurses in these communities 
which have undergone proper orientation in order to prepare them for the demanding nature of 
the job and expose them to the importance of First Nations‟ traditional values (Minore et al., 
2005; AFN, 2007). Further, as suggested by participants, FNIHB and JBGH should include plans 
to deploy an interdisciplinary team of health care professionals specializing in respiratory 
therapy, mental health, disease education, and post-pandemic psychological debriefing to 
provide additional services, if required. 
3.4.4 Improve plans for an Alternate Care Site  
The CPIPHS (2006) recommends that communities have guidelines in place to address the likely 
situation that health care facilities will become overwhelmed during an influenza pandemic. 
However, the Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (OHPIP) (2008) states that sources 
of funding for equipment and infrastructure for ACSs have not yet been identified. Therefore, 
participants suggested that government officials secure funding and human resources for an ACS 
and include details in community pandemic plans. 
3.4.5 Improve living conditions 
In 1876, the Indian Act entitled registered Indians on reserves to housing, education, and health 
care (MacMillan et al., 1996), either as a treaty right or fiduciary responsibility. Although, 
improvements have been made, impoverished crowded housing remains a problem in numerous 
First Nations communities (Smeja & Brassard, 2000; Tsuji, Iannucci, & Iannucci, 2000). 
Overcrowding in houses has been associated with increased probability of infectious respiratory 
disease transmission (Clark, Ribena, & Nowgesicb, 2002). Indeed, it has been reported that 
houses with many inhabitants posed issues to preventing disease spread (Massey et al., 2009). 
Therefore, government officials need to continue to focus efforts on improving the housing 
conditions in remote First Nations communities.   
3.4.6 Increase education and participation 
Some participants mentioned that community members did not always follow infection control 
recommendations and there was a lack of support from key players of the pandemic committee. 
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This can be attributed to the reported lack of community awareness regarding the pandemic, 
disease processes, and the effectiveness of proposed public health measures. Public 
communication is essential for community members to understand the situation and how to 
respond (CPIPHS, 2006). In First Nation communities, it is vital that educational programs are 
modified to respect their culture; for instance, how they interpret illness and their holistic 
approach to health issues (AFN, 2007; Young, Reading, Elias, & O‟Neil, 2000). Participants 
suggested community educational sessions to stress the importance of immunization, infection 
control, and general disease prevention. Furthermore, participants commented that it would be 
advantageous if government officials provided regional and community specific information 
geared towards influenza mitigation in a remote community.  
 
Also, to make pandemic preparedness a political priority and ensure participation by key players, 
local Band Councils can declare pandemic committee meetings as mandatory (AFN, 2007).  
3.5 Conclusion 
This qualitative study presents information to raise awareness about the unique needs of 
geographically remote and isolated First Nation communities during a public health emergency, 
which aims to improve current policies and plans. Government bodies should focus efforts to 
provide more support to these communities in terms of human resources, monies, and education. 
Additionally, resource distribution plans and housing conditions must be improved to lessen the 
impact social factors have on these communities.  
 
The identification of elements common to all of the communities‟ pandemic response may aide 
other remote and/or isolated communities improve their pandemic response. Furthermore, 
lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response may be transferable to improving how 
seasonal influenza epidemics and perhaps other communicable diseases are managed. Future 
studies should focus on how to feasibly improve the pandemic response capacity by remote and 




CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT BODIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE 2009 H1N1 
HEALTH SECTOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE IN REMOTE AND ISOLATED FIRST 
NATION COMMUNITIES OF SUB-ARCTIC ONTARIO, CANADA  
 
4.0 Overview  
Introduction: First Nation communities were highly impacted by the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. Multiple government bodies (i.e., federal, provincial, and First Nations) share 
responsibility for the health sector pandemic response in remote and isolated First Nation 
communities and it may have resulted in a fragmented pandemic response. Our study aimed to 
discover if and how the dichotomy (or trichotomy) between involved government bodies led to 
barriers faced and opportunities for improvement during the health sector response to the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic in three remote and isolated sub-arctic First Nation communities of northern 
Ontario, Canada.  
Methods: A qualitative community-based participatory approach was employed. Semi-directed 
interviews were conducted with adult key informants (n=13) using purposive sampling of 
participants representing the two (or three) government bodies of each study community. Data 
were manually transcribed and coded using deductive and inductive thematic analysis to reveal 
positive aspects, barriers faced, and opportunities for improvement along with the similarities 
and differences regarding the pandemic responses of each government body.   
Results: Common primary barriers faced by participants included receiving contradicting 
governmental guidelines and direction from many sources.  In addition, there was a lack of 
human resources, information sharing, and specific details in community-level pandemic plans. 
Recommended areas of improvement include developing a complementary communication plan, 
increasing human resources, and updating community-level pandemic plans.   
Conclusions: Participants reported many issues that may be attributable to the dichotomy (or 
trichotomy) between the multiple government bodies responsible for health care delivery during 
a pandemic. Increasing formal communication and collaboration between responsible 
government bodies will aide in clarifying roles and responsibilities and improve the pandemic 




Canada‟s First Nation populations appeared to have been severely impacted by the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic (Kumar et al., 2009; Kermode-Scott, 2009). First Nation populations are 
predisposed to becoming ill from an infectious disease due to various reasons, including the 
following: living conditions, impoverished lifestyles, presence of co-morbidities, and (in some 
cases) being geographically remote (Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010; MacMillan et al., 
1996; OHPIP, 2008).  
In 1876, the Indian Act entitled registered Indians on reserves to health care (MacMillan et al., 
1996). In Canada, the provision of health care to the general Canadian population is the 
responsibility of the provincial/territorial governments; however, registered Indians are entitled 
to additional non-insured health benefits provided by the federal government (Tsuji, 1998). 
Therefore, First Nation communities are unique in that federal, provincial, and First Nation 
governments share responsibility of the delivery of health care services (CPIPHS, 2006). 
Historically, there has been a lack of coordination between the provincial and federal 
governments with regards to providing health care for Aboriginals (Tsuji, 1998; MacMillan et 
al., 1996). During a pandemic influenza, the various involved government organizations have yet 
to clearly define roles and responsibilities and establish all of the necessary formal agreements, 
which may cause a fragmented pandemic response (CPIPHS, 2006).   
In this study, we present a retrospective insight into barriers faced by three government sectors 
(i.e., federal, provincial, and First Nations) in three remote and isolated First Nation communities 
of northern Ontario, Canada, during the health sector response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. In addition, participants identified culturally appropriate opportunities for 
improvement, which should be addressed in future pandemic plans. 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 Study community profiles  
The three study communities (referred to as Community A, B, and C for anonymity purposes) 
are located in northern Ontario, Canada. All three communities have similar living conditions 
and are considered geographically remote (the nearest service center with year-round road access 
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is located over 350 kilometers away) and isolated (only accessible by planes year-round) 
(CPIPHS, 2006) (Table 5). An elected Chief and Council (or Band Council) governs each First 
Nation community and are key decision makers regarding how a pandemic is managed. Health 
Canada‟s FNIHB is responsible for the provision of primary health care (if provincial services 
are not available) and public health services in geographically remote and isolated First Nation 
communities (CPIPHS, 2006; OHPIP, 2008). All three study communities have a health center 
for community public health services. During an influenza pandemic, community public health 
personnel roles included immunizations, case and contact management, and education. 
Additionally, each community has a primary care facility - during a pandemic - primary care 
facility personnel are responsible for providing medical care and dispensing treatments. These 
primary care facilities are covered by 24-hour nursing care with sporadic physician visits, and 
possess selected medical equipment; however, any patients requiring care beyond their 
capabilities must be transported to the nearest accommodating health care facility (Tsuji, 1998). 
Table 5. Characteristics of the study communities  
Characteristic  Community A Community B Community C 
Public health facility Federal health center Federal health center Federal health center 







4.2.2 Community-based participatory approach 
These three communities were chosen for the following reasons: geo-spatial proximity to one 
another;  community members expressed an interest in examining how effective their pandemic 
plan was meeting the needs of the community; and the desire of the First Nations to actively 
participate in the planning process in preparation for the next public health emergency. The 
authors formed a partnership with the study communities and this research can be described as a 
community-based participatory approach. All aspects of the study were developed and 
implemented in collaboration with a community-based, advisory group formed of representatives 
from the communities‟ health centers and Band Councils (Macaulay et al., 1998). For instance, 
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the community advisory group approved the interview questions to ensure they were valid and 
culturally appropriate (Kirby et al., 2007). This type of approach has been shown to be successful 
for research with Aboriginal communities in that the research is conducted in a culturally 
appropriate manner and directly meets the needs of the communities (Macaulay et al., 1998; 
Davis & Reid, 1999). Ethics clearance to conduct this research was granted through the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  
4.2.3 Data collection and sources 
Participants were purposively chosen from each study community who had the authority to 
represent and who were particularly informative about their respective government body's 
involvement in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response (Neuman & Robson, 2009). Specifically, the 
health director/supervisor, nurse-in-charge, and/or community health nurse at the health centers 
(or nursing station) were selected as the federal government representatives. The director of 
patient care and/or clinical coordinator at the hospital wing were the selected provincial 
representatives. Lastly, First Nations government representatives included the Chief and/or 
Deputy Chief of each community's Band Council.  
Interviews were conducted with 13 adults during the period from February 9 to 23, 2010 to gain 
an in-depth account of participants' experience during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response 
(Neuman & Robson, 2009). Being culturally appropriate for the First Nation communities, 
verbal informed consent from participants was obtained (Skinner et al., 2006; Kirby et al., 2007). 
Interviews were semi-directive to ensure consistent questions were asked based on academic 
literatures of health care service aspects of a pandemic response. This method also allowed for 
flexibility as participants were able to elaborate on what they felt was important (Daly, 2007). 
Individual interviews lasted from 15 minutes to 1.5 hours long and were conducted in English at 
a convenient place and time for the participant. With the participant‟s permission, interviews 
were audio recorded and detailed notes were taken.    
4.2.4 Data management and analyses  
Interviews were manually transcribed verbatim into electronic format. Collected data were 
organized according to “theory-driven” and “data-driven” codes using a combination of 
deductive and inductive thematic analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Using a template 
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organizing approach, the seven broad codes of the regional FNIHB pandemic influenza plan 
were used to provide a flexible guide to deductively code relevant data (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; 
FNIHB-OR PIP, 2006; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Via inductive coding, segments of 
data pertaining to supplies and equipment were coded as a newly emerged code (Boyatzis, 1998). 
For subsequent analysis and interpretation, the data were further categorized according to main 
interview trigger questions (i.e., positive aspects, barriers faced, and suggested improvements), 
always noting which community and government body the commenting participant represented 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). This approach was chosen to allow for comparisons 
regarding the similarities and differences experienced during the pandemic response within and 
between each government body within the three study communities. The aforementioned data 
analysis was an iterative process completed by the author (NAC) and confirmed by the co-author 
(LJST) to ensure accuracy.    
Members of each study community‟s pandemic committee validated the resulting eight codes. 
Attending members included representatives from various sectors involved in the community‟s 
pandemic response: Band Council, health center, hospital wing, education, clergy, Northern 
store, water treatment plant, and emergency medical services. Eight to ten people attended each 
community meeting and no changes were proposed. This validation method was chosen because 
the resulting codes would create the framework for each community‟s modified community-level 
pandemic plan; thus, directly applying the study‟s findings (Sandelowski, 1997).  
4.3 Results 
Data analyses revealed eight codes; however, three codes (e.g., vaccine, supplies, and public 
health measures) were selectively omitted to present the most relevant results pertaining to the 
present paper. Representative quotes were used to highlight key findings; however, for 
anonymity purposes, information about the commenting participant will not be disclosed 
(Minore et al., 2005; Knafl & Howard, 1984).     
4.3.1 Surveillance 
Influenza surveillance involves the collection of information about influenza-related cases in 
order to determine the severity and potential impact of influenza activity (CPIPHS, 2006). In 
general, participants representing the provincially run hospital wing believed that the 
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surveillance system employed during the pandemic response worked well, despite being initially 
complicated. One participant mentioned that feedback from surveillance reports would be 
appreciated to ensure proper actions were being executed.  
In Community A and B, some issues arose with regards to when specimens from patients should 
be taken for laboratory testing, since some federal representatives disagreed with their 
counterpart‟s instructions. This led to pressure to not follow their respective organization‟s 
guidelines; for instance, a provincial representative mentioned, 
… it was people wanting to put pressure on us, but we’re walking a fine line because we 
had to follow the guidelines set down by the medical officer of health [provincial 
jurisdiction], but at the same time, try to relieve the pressure from public health [federal 
government personnel] … (Participant #2).  
Some federal representatives noted that there was a lack of information sharing with the 
provincial agency with regards to which patients were being tested in order to promptly and 
properly conduct case and contact management. These representatives noted that they only 
received a report if a positive case had been confirmed. In addition, federal representatives 
believed that the provincial hospital wing did not promptly set up a designated assessment area 
for patients with ILI symptoms and suggested that improving influenza assessments should be a 
priority for the next time.  
4.3.2 Antivirals 
In two communities, participants agreed that the antivirals were efficiently distributed, in that 
patients who met the guidelines received the needed treatment. In contrast, federal and provincial 
participants from one community were in disagreement. Although the provincial representative 
stated that they followed the provided guidelines, federal participants believed that the antivirals 
were not efficiently distributed. It was reported that only 22 doses were distributed out of the 424 
received doses even though many community members were displaying ILI symptoms. The 
federal representatives indicated that they would like antivirals to be better distributed, including 




4.3.3 Health Services 
Representatives from each government body agreed that there was a lack of human resources, 
especially nurses, during the pandemic response in each study community. As one participant 
stated,   
… they [nurses] were expected [to do] too much and they didn’t have enough additional 
staff to do it. Cause the hospital room was really packed in the evenings, and they didn’t 
have enough nurses to work with the people. And they did their best, and I think we, they 
were overtired, overburdened … (Participant #7).  
Moreover, a participant remarked that due to the shortage of human resources, they were unable 
to follow up with ill families to provide necessary support and believed this should be improved 
upon. The participant remarked,  
Even if there was a house... affected with H1N1, if a family were affected, we didn’t even 
touch base on how we know what they’re short on and stuff like that, what they need 
(Participant #9).  
Many participants mentioned that they want more human resources available for future 
pandemics, especially nurses and trained personnel with the expertise to deal with a public health 
emergency.  
4.3.4 Emergency Response 
In one community, the federal representatives felt that certain aspects of the emergency response 
section of the pandemic plan were not adequately addressed in a timely manner. The federal 
representatives reported that isolation and quarantine issues were not specified and implemented. 
In addition, the federal representatives stated that details with regards to a morgue were not 
adequately addressed and that there was no appropriate site in the community, especially if a 
public health emergency occurred in the spring time. A federal representative questioned,   
… we didn’t go into it that if there were more deaths in the community, where would the 
bodies be stored? You know so, who would be handling the bodies? (Participant #10).  
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However, the provincial participant stated that the provincial organization had a morgue plan in 
place and had established a site. Therefore, the federal participants believed that specific 
information regarding morgue, isolation, and quarantine issues should be properly outlined in the 
community-level pandemic plans after in-depth discussions with the community pandemic 
committee. 
4.3.5 Communications 
All provincial representatives stated that they were prepared for the outbreak, although it took a 
few days to implement aspects of the response and improvements could be made to increase 
efficiency. In contrast, some federal and Band representatives from each study community 
believed that their respective community was not prepared for the pandemic for various reasons, 
such as lack of resources and cooperation from key players of the community pandemic 
committee. A participant mentioned,  
 
Yeah, so we weren’t really ready for this pandemic situation. So, it’s like that in a remote 
area, we’re the last one to get the resources and it’s very unfortunate … (Participant 7).  
  
Some provincial representatives reported that they received contradicting guidelines from many 
sources and were initially extracting the best information from each direction. Since this was 
confusing, they eventually decided to only follow their respective organization‟s direction, 
although these directions were sometimes ambiguous and changed frequently. Federal 
representative also noted that they received different information than the provincial body at 
different times. This discrepancy between provincial and federal instructions led to a fragmented 
approach along with multiple disagreements and confusion amongst the federal and provincial 
representatives from both Community A and B. As one participant mentioned,  
As you can understand, we’re provincial, the other side over there, is federal, so they 
were having their guidelines, and we were having our guidelines, and their guidelines 





Another participant noted,  
 
… it was like a lot of different information[s] coming in, it would have been nice just to 
see one, one person reporting and that would have been either the province or feds, 
didn’t matter what which one. It would have been nice to have one just at a region, you 
know, just had a regional one … (Participant #1).  
 
One participant also noted that each agency had its own respective pandemic plan in addition to 
the community pandemic plan. With multiple pandemic plans in place, the participant stated that 
there was confusion with regards to each agency's roles and responsibilities during a pandemic. 
4.4 Discussion 
 
In general, participants reported many issues which may be attributable to the dichotomy (or 
trichotomy) between the multiple government bodies responsible for health-care delivery during 
an influenza pandemic. Interestingly, participants from Community C did not report some of 
these issues, possibly due to the fact that both the health center and nursing station are federally 
funded. The CPIPHS (2006) states that the involved government bodies have very few formal 
arrangements in place and gaps remain with regards to managing a pandemic influenza outbreak 
in First Nation communities; thus, the present study‟s results have informed the following 
recommendations which can be achieved by increasing formal communication and collaboration 
amongst the government bodies.   
 
4.4.1 Improve communication plans 
The Bellagio Group stresses the importance of equitable access to accurate and easily understood 
information during an influenza pandemic (Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, 2006). 
The CPIPHS (2006) states that it is the responsibility of all levels of the government (i.e., local, 
regional, provincial, and federal) to provide on-reserve First Nation communities with accurate, 
timely and consistent information during an influenza pandemic. However, participants reported 
that these multiple sources of information were sometimes inconsistent, misleading, and 
contradictory; therefore, participants suggested that one reliable source should provide the 
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necessary information. We recommend that all levels of government collaborate to create a 
consistent and complementary communication effort, especially when providing guidelines. 
Additionally, based on the literature, we recommend that the regional FNIHB be the source to 
provide the necessary information to First Nation communities.  
4.4.2 Update community-level pandemic plans  
Adequate preparedness plans should be developed and in place to mitigate the impact of an 
influenza pandemic (Oshitani, Kamigaki, & Suzuki, 2008; WHO, 2009). The WHO has 
developed various tools to help countries with their preparation for an influenza pandemic, 
including a preparedness planning checklist (Oshitani et al., 2008; WHO, 2005). While national 
planning is imperative to make recommendations and set standards, planning at the community 
level is also vital to warrant that these measures can be effectively implemented (Hampton, 
2007). The WHO tools, along with the current national and provincial pandemic plans, offer 
universal methods which may not be feasible in remote and isolated First Nation communities 
due to their unique challenges (i.e., living conditions, lack of access to resources and health care, 
presence of co-morbidities) (Oshitani et al., 2008; WHO, 2005; CPIPHS, 2006; OHPIP, 2008; 
Groom et al., 2009; MacMillan et al., 1996; Kermode-Scott, 2009; Barker, 2010). FNIHB 
regions have developed regional pandemic influenza plans and should continue to assist First 
Nation communities to develop community-level pandemic plans which are appropriately 
modified to specifically meet their requirements (CPIPHS, 2006).  
For instance, the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as isolation and quarantine, may 
be useful in mitigating the effects of a pandemic, especially due to the limitations of availability 
and effectiveness of pharmaceutical interventions like vaccines and antivirals (Aledort, Lurie, 
Wasserman, & Bozzette, 2007; OHPIP, 2008; Sullivan, Jacobson, Dowdle, & Poland, 2010; 
Fedson, 2003; Leung & Nicoll, 2010; Oshitani, 2006; Low, 2008). Thus, it is important that 
community-level pandemic plans contain specific information about various non-pharmaceutical 
interventions that can be implemented.  
In addition, historic data has shown that over 70% of a population may become infected by a 
novel virus during a pandemic; therefore, plans to manage mass fatalities should be addressed in 
community-level pandemic plans (CPIPHS, 2006). These plans should be based on local needs 
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and availability of resources, in addition to local limitations and cultural considerations 
(CPIPHS, 2006). For instance, northern remote and isolated communities may face difficulties 
with transportation of bodies to the place of burial and lack of funeral service personnel and 
resources (CPIPHS, 2006). Therefore, as suggested by participants, the aforementioned issues 
should be specifically addressed in community-level pandemic plans.  
Furthermore, the CPIPHS (CPIPHS, 2006) provides a well-intentioned table outlining the roles 
and responsibilities of the partners involved in the management of a pandemic influenza in on-
reserve First Nation communities. However, participants mentioned that roles and 
responsibilities were not clearly defined and executed at the local level. It is recommended that 
these communities, with the help of the government, outline the roles and responsibilities of each 
agency and include the details in the community-level pandemic plan, which will hopefully lay 
the foundation for a cohesive and effective pandemic response.    
4.4.3 Increase human resources 
In these northern remote and isolated communities, nurses work in an expanded role as they are 
the main providers of health care services (Tsuji, 1998). Literature has shown that geographically 
isolated First Nation communities under normal circumstances suffer from shortages of trained 
health care professionals, particularly nurses, and are typically forced to rely on relief staff which 
can have negative effects on health care services (MacMillan et al., 1996; Minore et al., 2005; 
Minore, Boone, & Hill, 2004). During a public health emergency, such as an influenza 
pandemic, human resources will play a central role in the response and will be required to 
implement various pharmaceutical interventions and provide medical care for patients (Ives et 
al., 2009; Oshitani et al., 2008). However, in an influenza pandemic, staff shortages may be 
exacerbated by various reasons, such as falling ill oneself, transportation challenges, 
childcare/family obligations, and fear of exposure to name a few (Hampton, 2007; Ives et al., 
2009; Wilson, Baker, Crampton, & Mansoor, 2005).  
 
Health Canada‟s FNIHB is responsible for providing health care services to on-reserve First 
Nation communities and should continue to prioritize recruiting a full-time, permanent 
complement of nurses (CPIPHS, 2006). To aide in retaining nursing staff, recruited nurses 
should be provided with a proper orientation to prepare them for the demanding nature of the job 
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and to learn about the importance of respecting First Nations‟ traditional values (Minore et al., 
2005; AFN, 2007). During an influenza pandemic, some broad strategies can be implemented to 
mitigate the effects on health care personnel, such as establishing designated clinics for patients 
with influenza-like illness symptoms and improving the surge capacity of health sector (Wilson 
et al., 2005). A participant also suggested that during a public health emergency pre-approved 
vacation time should be postponed or cancelled to optimize the number of health care personnel. 
Furthermore, as suggested by participants, plans should be developed to deploy an 
interdisciplinary team of health care professionals with the expertise to deal with a public health 




Remote and isolated First Nation communities are unique in that multiple government bodies 
share responsibility for the health of their community members during a public health 
emergency. This qualitative study presents an insight into the barriers that arose during the 
pandemic response of three communities possibly due to the dichotomy (or trichotomy) between 
government bodies and suggests recommendations which can be incorporated into future 
pandemic plans. While progress has been made, it is hoped that via formal communication and 
collaboration, the aforementioned issues will be addressed and will lead to an improved and 






CHAPTER 5: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY-LEVEL PANDEMIC PLANS 
(KNOWLEDGE TRANSLATION) 
5.0 Introduction 
The literature review (i.e., chapter two) and the results of chapters three and four indicated that 
the three remote and isolated First Nation study communities (i.e., Fort Albany, Attawapiskat, 
and Kashechewan) can improve their pandemic response by including community-based input 
into future community-level pandemic plans. This chapter presents the knowledge translation or 
“linking research to action” component of this endeavour. More specifically, this chapter 
describes how the qualitative research findings were directly applied to modify community-level 
pandemic plans to meet each community‟s specific needs. The evolutionary stages of each study 
community‟s community-level pandemic plan are described.  
5.0.1 Knowledge Translation 
There has been a growing concern that research findings are not being optimally and promptly 
utilized to change current practice methods (Graham et al., 2006). A WHO report states that it is 
important to enhance the knowledge translation (KT) process by directly linking research results 
to action (WHO, 2004; Majdzadeh, Nedjat, Denis, Yazdizadeh, & Gholami, 2010; Graham et al., 
2006). The knowledge-to-action process encompasses both knowledge creation and knowledge 
action (Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), 2010; Graham et al., 2006). Knowledge 
creation is the process by which knowledge becomes more refined and relevant to the 
stakeholders. For instance, at each phase of knowledge creation, the researchers can adapt the 
research to meet the needs of the knowledge-user (CIHR, 2010; Graham et al., 2006). 
Knowledge action is the cycle which represents how the knowledge is implemented and applied 
(CIHR, 2010; Graham et al., 2006). In Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 
defines the term knowledge translation as, “a dynamic and iterative process that includes 
synthesis, dissemination, exchange and ethically-sound application of knowledge to improve the 
health of Canadians, provide more effective health services and products and strengthen the 




5.0.2 Objective  
The main objective of my research endeavour was to engage the end users in the research 
process by collecting qualitative community-based data to inform modifications to community-
level pandemic plans. These modified community-level pandemic plans will hopefully lead to an 
improved pandemic response capacity and improve health outcomes during the next public 
health emergency.  
5.1 Methodology 
Each study community had a pandemic plan in place during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which 
will be referred to as the 1
st
 generation community-level pandemic plan (brief details are 
included in chapter two). Via two rounds of semi-directed interviews and one community 
pandemic committee meeting per First Nation, qualitative data were collected to inform 
modifications to each study community‟s 1
st
 generation community-level pandemic plan (Figure 
2). Each subsequent version of the community-level pandemic plan was orally validated by 
community members.    
Figure 2. Stages of modifying community-level pandemic plans for the three participating First 
Nations
The first round of semi-directed interviews was conducted during the period from February 9 to 
23, 2010 with 13 adult key informants (details included in chapters three and four). Collected 
qualitative data were used to inform modifications resulting in a 2
nd
 generation community-level 
pandemic plan for each study community. The 2
nd
 generation community-level pandemic plans 
included colour coded modifications suggested by community members responsible for the 
health sector pandemic response from their respective community and the other two participating 
4th generation 3




















communities. This method was employed since all communities share similar living conditions; 
therefore, other communities‟ suggestions may be relevant and desired. Suggested modifications 
to the 2
nd
 generation community-level pandemic plans were also ascertained from relevant 
academic literatures (details included in chapter two). 
The second round of semi-directed interviews was conducted during the period from May 31 to 
June 10, 2010 with the health director/supervisor of each study community‟s health center. In 
Attawapiskat, the nurse-in-charge also attended. The health director/supervisor was chosen since 
he/she assumes a lead role during a pandemic response and is mainly responsible for community 
health. During the semi-directed interview, participants were given their respective 2
nd
 
generation community-level pandemic plan and asked to validate its contents. Each page of the 
plan was reviewed with the participant thereby giving him/her an opportunity to comment on all 
aspects of plan. Specific questions were also asked to gain more detail about some aspects of the 
pandemic plan. Desired modifications resulted in the 3
rd




 generation community-level pandemic plan was subsequently presented to the study 
community‟s pandemic committee during the period from July 27 to August 13, 2010. As 
mentioned, eight to ten representatives from various sectors involved in the community‟s 
pandemic response attended, including Band Council, health center, hospital wing, education, 
clergy, Northern store, water treatment plant, and emergency medical services. Proposed 
modifications from each community pandemic committee meeting resulted in the 4
th
 generation 
community-level pandemic plan. At the request of the community, multiple copies of this 
version were made and presented. Additionally, a representative from the Band Council (i.e., 
Chief) and health center (i.e., health director/supervisor) were given digital versatile discs (DVD) 
of their respective community-level pandemic plan. This allows the dynamic pandemic plan to 




 Generation Community-Level Pandemic Plan 
As mentioned, the 2
nd
 generation community-level pandemic plans included colour coded 
modifications suggested by participants of all study communities during the 1
st
 round of semi-
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directed interviews and relevant academic literatures. Note in Fort Albany, the existing FAFNPP 
and PHSPP were amalgamated to reduce redundancies and create one cohesive pandemic plan.  
Primary modification made which resulted in the 2
nd
 generation community-level pandemic plan, 
included:  
 Updated names and contact information of community pandemic committee members.  
 Added emergency phone numbers and a list of abbreviations.   
 Specific detail was added about the surveillance system, mass immunization clinic 
protocol, ILI screening, home support program, planning for acute patients, and 
community infection control measures (CICM).     
 “Supplies” was added as a section in each phase (i.e., pre-pandemic, pandemic, post-
pandemic), consistent with it being an emerging code from the data. The supplies section 
included details about ordering and providing supplies, a list of pandemic influenza 
supplies, and formulas for ordering pandemic influenza supplies.  
 Specifically in AFNPP, post-pandemic phase sections (i.e., surveillance, vaccine, 
antivirals and antibiotics, health services, supplies, emergency response, public health 
measures) were added as these sections were omitted in the 1
st
 generation community-
level pandemic plan.  
 Specifically in KFNPP, one post-pandemic phase section (i.e., antivirals and antibiotics) 
was added as it was omitted in the 1
st
 generation community-level pandemic plan.   
5.2.2 3
rd
 Generation Community-Level Pandemic Plan 
Primary modifications suggested by health directors/supervisors which resulted in the 3
rd
 
generation community-level pandemic plan included:  
 Updated names and contact information of community pandemic committee members.  
 Removed “Tasks to be completed” column of each section of each phase.  
 Specific detail was added about the surveillance system and ordering, storing, and 
distributing antivirals.   
 Added Appendices section which included sixteen appendices with detailed information: 
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o WHO Pandemic Influenza Phases, Canadian Activity Level, Mass Immunization 
Clinic Protocol, PHAC: Mass Immunization Clinics in Remote & Isolated 
Communities (website link), Human Resource Contingency Plans, List of 
Essential Services, Alternate Care Site Plan, Outbreak Control Team (and Clinical 
Pandemic Response Group) (named Command Center in KFNPP), List of 
Pandemic Influenza Supplies, FNIHB Formulas for Pandemic Influenza Supplies, 
Community Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan, Corpse Storage and 
Temporary Morgue Plan, Community Infection Control Measures, Templates for 
Community Notices, Communication Plan, Helpful Resources (website links)  
5.2.3 4
th
 Generation Community-Level Pandemic Plan 
After the community pandemic committee meetings, some minor wording changes were made 
throughout the pandemic plans resulting in the 4
th
 generation community-level pandemic plans 
(Charania et al., 2010a; Charania et al., 2010b; Charania et al., 2010c). Primary modifications 
included:  
 Updated names and contact information of community pandemic committee members.  
 In the FAFNPP and AFNPP, a statement about having the health care staff properly fitted 
for N95 masks was added in the “Supplies” section of each phase.   
 In the KFNPP, a statement about the local store having disinfectant wipes available was 
added to the “Supplies” section of the pandemic phase.  
 Noteworthy changes to Appendices section: 
o Mass Immunization Clinic Protocol 
 In the KFNPP, a protocol specifically developed for Kashechewan First 
Nation by a local Registered Nurse was included.  
o Alternate Care Site Plan  
 In the FAFNPP and AFNPP, specific information regarding the 
organizers, location, and special considerations was added.   
o Corpse Storage and Temporary Morgue Plan 
 In the FAFNPP, AFNPP and KFNPP, location options for a temporary 




In summary, most changes to the community-level pandemic plans involved adding specific 
detail, including clarifying roles and responsibilities of each organization. Although many 
updates were made, some areas still require modifications. For instance, human resource 
contingency plans for each workplace in the community should be included in the community-
level pandemic plan. Moreover, after further debriefing with the community pandemic 
committee, additional detail should be included in the alternate care site plan, the community 
emergency preparedness and response plan, and the corpse storage and temporary morgue plan. 
Furthermore, the community infection control measures should be revised according to the 
recent research evidence base, specifically with regards to what measures are effective at 
mitigating a pandemic in remote and isolated communities.    
These community-level pandemic plans are dynamic; therefore, it is anticipated that in the future 
these plans will be re-assessed and further modified to meet the evolving needs of each 













CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter outlines the main implications of the two papers and the knowledge translation 
aspect of this research. The objective of this research was to gain insight into the health sector 
pandemic response of three remote and isolated First Nation communities, since research has 
shown that disadvantaged groups may be disproportionately impacted by public health 
emergencies.  
Issues that arose regarding the study communities‟ 2009 H1N1 pandemic response appeared to 
stem either from the geographical remoteness of the communities or because health care in First 
Nation communities is uniquely governed.  Chapter three outlined the primary barriers which 
impacted the remote and isolated communities, including issues with overcrowding in houses, 
insufficient human resources, and inadequate community awareness. Chapter four outlined the 
barriers faced in the study communities due to the existing dichotomy (or trichotomy) between 
the government bodies responsible for the delivery of health care, including receiving 
contradicting guidelines and direction, sufficient information sharing, and lack of specific details 
in community-level pandemic plans. The findings of this research indicate that more attention 
must be focused to ensure remote and isolated First Nation communities‟ concerns are addressed 
in the future. Effort should be directed towards developing plans to provide funding, supplies, 
and human resources as needed when responding to a public health emergency. Additionally, 
funding needs to be directed to improve the living conditions currently experienced in most First 
Nation communities. Furthermore, it is recommended that improvements be made to improve the 
health care delivery capabilities, specifically regarding equipment and human resources, in 
geographically remote communities to better prepare them for the next public health emergency. 
Moreover, increased formal communication and collaboration should occur between responsible 
government bodies to clarify roles and responsibilities during an influenza pandemic.   
Findings of this research were also used to modify community-level pandemic plans, thereby 
linking research to action. Chapter five described the various changes to the communities‟ 
pandemic plans, most of which involved adding specific detail. Therefore, it is recommended 
that all federal and provincial pandemic plans add specific detail which will facilitate an 
improved pandemic response since people will be identified and responsible for certain actions. 
As the plans are “living documents”, it is anticipated that after the next public health emergency, 
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the pandemic response will be re-assessed for barriers and possible solutions resulting in further 
modifications to the plans as part of the knowledge action process.   
Future research should be directed towards finding and implementing solutions to improve the 
sharing of health information between responsible government bodies in remote and isolated 
First Nation communities. In addition, empirical research should be conducted to discover which 
non-pharmaceutical measures are effective in mitigating an influenza pandemic in remote and 
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